That can be done already based on User-Agent, though. Other browsers don't spoof their agent strings to look like Chrome, and never have (or, they do, but only in the sense that everyone still claims to be Mozilla). And browsers have always (for obvious reasons) been very happy to identify themselves correctly to backend sites.
The purpose here is surely to detect sophisticated spoofing by non-user-browser software, like crawlers and robots. Robots are in fact required by the net's Geneva Convention equivalent to identify themselves and respect limitations, but obviously many don't.
I have a hard time understanding robot detection as an issue of "user freedom" or "browser competition".
>I have a hard time understanding robot detection as an issue of "user freedom" or "browser competition".
The big one is that running a browser other than Chrome (or Safari) could come to mean endless captchas, degrading the experience. "Chrome doesn't have as many captchas" is a pretty good hook.
Not to mention how often you can get stuck in an infinite loop where it just will not accept your captcha results and keeps making you do it over and over. Especially if you’re using a VPN. It’s maddening sometimes. Can’t even do a basic search
So the market isn't allowed to detect robots because some sites have bad captcha implementations? I'm not following. Captchas aren't implement by the browser.
> So the market isn't allowed to detect robots (...)
I don't know what you mean by "the market".
What I do know is that if I try to go to a site with my favourite browser and a site blocks me because it's so poorly engineered it thinks I am a bot just because I'm not using Chrome, then it's pretty obvious that it's not detecting bots.
Also worth noting: it might surprise you that there browser automation frameworks. Some of them, such as Selenium, support Chrome.
I’m not sure who “the market” is in this case, but reCAPTCHA is owned and implemented by Google and clearly favors their browser. Any attempts to use other browsers or obfuscate your digital footprint in the slightest leads to all kinds of headaches. It’s a very convenient side effect of their “anti-bot” efforts that they have every incentive to steer in to.
This isn't Google's doing but Mozilla's. Firefox's strict tracking protection blocks third-party cookies. The site you're trying to visit isn't hosting reCAPTCHA itself; reCAPTCHA was loaded from a third-party origin (Google); so the cookie that Google sets saying you passed the CAPTCHA is blocked by Firefox.
You can add an exception in Firefox's settings to allow third-party cookies for CAPTCHAs. Google's reCAPTCHA cookie is set by "recaptcha.net", and CloudFlare's CAPTCHA has exactly the same problem, whose domain is "challenges.cloudflare.com".
If the cookies aren't set and passed back, then they can't know that you've solved it, so you get another one.
You're blaming Mozilla because they fixed a security vulnerability, and then saying that the workaround is to reenable the vulnerability so that Google can continue surveilling.
Yet for some inexplicable reason all the other bot detection methods I encounter online don’t struggle at all with me and don’t stick me in infinite loops. Cloudflare for instance simply does not bug out with rare exceptions for me.
Maybe my experience is atypical but it seems to me this is a reCAPTCHA problem, not a Mozilla one. It’s Google’s problem. I imagine they can solve this but simply don’t want to.
Maybe I’m wrong but again, i encounter more issues with their “anti bot” methods than any other by a massive margin.
Concretely: Google meet blocks all sorts of browsers / private tabs with a vague: “you cannot join this meeting” error. They let mainstream ones in though.
I use Safari (admittedly, with Private Cloud and a few tracking-blocking extensions) and get bombarded with Cloudflare's 'prove you are human' checkbox several times an hour.
> I have a hard time understanding robot detection as an issue of "user freedom" or "browser competition".
In the name of robot detection, you can lock down device, require device attestation, prevent users from running non-standard devices/OS/software, prevent them from accessing websites (CloudFlare dislikes non-chrome browser and hates non-standard browsers, ReCaptcha blocks you out if you're not on Chrome-like/Safari/Firefox). Web Environment Integrity[1] is also a good example of where robot detection ends up affecting the end user.
The purpose here isn't to deal with sophisticated spoofing. This is setting a couple of headers to fixed and easily discoverable values. It wouldn't stop a teenager with Curl, let along a sophisticated adversary. There's no counter-abuse value here at all.
It's quite hard to figure out what this is for, because the mechanism is so incredibly weak. Either it was implemented by some total idiots who did not bother talking at all to the thousands of people with counter-abuse experience that work at Google, or it is meant for some incredibly specific case where they think the copyright string actually provides a deterrent.
(If I had to guess, it's about protecting server APIs only meant for use by the Chrome browser, not about protecting any kind of interactive services used directly by end-users.)
I would imagine that this serves the same purpose as the way that early home consoles would check the inserted cartridge to see that it had a specific copyright message in it, because then you can't reproduce that message without violating the copyright.
In this case, you would need to reproduce a message that explicitly states that it's Google's copyright, and that you don't have the right to copy it ("All rights reserved."). Doing that might then give Google the legal evidence it needs to sue you.
In other words, a legal deterrence rather than a technical one.
> Why do you think Chrome bothers with this extra headers. Anti-spoofing, bot detection, integrity or something else?
Bot detection. It's a menace to literally everyone. Not to piss anyone off, but if you haven't dealt with it, you don't have anything of value to scrape or get access to.
> Bot detection. It's a menace to literally everyone. Not to piss anyone off, but if you haven't dealt with it, you don't have anything of value to scrape or get access to.
What leads you to believe that bit developers are unable to set a request header?
They managed fine to set Chrome's user agent. Why do you think something like X-Browser-Validation is off limits?
Because you would need to reproduce an explicit Google copyright statement which states that you don't have the right to copy it ("All rights reserved.") in order to do it fully.
That presumably gives Google the legal ammunition it needs to sue you if you do it.
I'm no lawyer, but my take on it is that by reproducing this particular value for the validation header, you are stating that you are the Chrome browser. It's likely that this has been implemented in such a way that other browsers could use it too if they so choose; the expected contents of the copyright header can then change depending on what you have in the validation header.
To me, it seems likely that the spec is for a legally defensible User-Agent header.
Only if they know to implement it and while it uses a more trivial approach. I expect it to become increasingly difficult gradually. It's also yet another way to make mistakes and make it entirely obvious that one is forging Chrome.
Yes I think it is part of their multi level testing of for new version rollouts. In addition to all the internal unit and performance tests, they want an extra level of verification that weird things aren't happening in the wild
It's still not clear to me because it's called the default API key. And for me, default means that this is normally overwritten. And if overwritten, during build or during install? That's what I'm asking myself.
This should be somewhat alarming to anyone who already knows about WEI.
I wonder if "x-browser-copyright" is an attempt at trying to use the legal system to stifle competition and further their monopoly. If so, have they not heard of Sega v. Accolade ?
I'm a bit amused that they're using SHA-1. Why not MD5, CRC32, or (as the dumb security scanners would recommend) even SHA256?
I am also alarmed. Google has to split off its development of both Chrome and Android now, this crazy vertical integration is akin to a private company building and owning both the roads AND the cars. Sure, you can build other cars, but we just need to verify that your tires are safe before you can drive on OUR roads. It's fine as long as you build your car on our complete frame, you can still choose whatever color you like! Also, the car has ads.
All of YouTube. The vast majority of email. All sources of revenue for ad-funded sites, basically, except for those ads pushed by Meta in their respective walled gardens. They are also the gatekeepers deciding what parts of the internet the users actually see, and they continuously work towards preventing people from actually visiting other sites by siphoning off information and keeping users on Google (AMP, AI summaries). The whole Play Store ecosystem is a walled garden which pretends to be open by building on an ostensibly open source OS but adding strict integrity checks on top which gives Google the ultimate power to decide what is allowed to run on peoples phones.
They don't have to own the servers and the pipes if they own all the clients, sources of revenue, distribution platforms and financial transaction systems.
Oh I am not saying they're not a gigantic provider, I'm saying less than a third is very far from "the vast majority" and exageration and misinformation help no one's case, be they on purpose or due to lack of knowledge.
I would shy away from calling them a majority myself, but it’s a fair point.
Remember that email involves at least two parties. It doesn’t matter if I use a non-Google provider, I still have to follow all of Google’s email rules, or email will be useless to me because I wouldn’t be able to send mail to Gmail or Google Workspace users.
In a practical sense, Google have very direct control over almost all email.
In the math department, we had a Moodle the students in the first year of my university in Argentina.
When we started like 15 years ago, the emails of the students and TA were evenly split in 30% Gmail, 30% Yahoo!, 30% Hotmail and 10% others (very aproxímate numbers).
Now the students have like 80% Gmail, 10% Live/Outlook/Hotmail and 10% others/Yahoo. Some of the TA are much older, so perhaps "only" 50% use Gmail.
The difference is huge. I blame the mandatory gmail account for the cell phone.
Anyway, we had weird problems with Live/Outlook/Hotmail and Yahoo because they classified some of our emails as spam. Gmail usually works better.
Anyway^2, everyone is using WhatsApp, so it doesn't matter.
Here, for a lot of profesional (from medical doctors to plumbers) the only contact is a WhatsApp numbers, no email, no real phone.
At work, 70% of the messages are by WhatsApp. We have like 10 buildings distributed in a 3 million person city, like 3 miles away from each other. So there is a lot of global coordination (mostly by WA). Also inside each building each subgroup of TA (like Algebra+Monday-Thursday+Morning) has one WA group, and the students have an unofficial WA per course.
We even have a WA group for the "HOA" of my home. (It's an apartment.) People can't maintain a mailing list or use CC correctly, but can use WA.
And there is another WA for the parents in each course of my children in primary school. Everything is discussed there, in particular invitations to birthday parties. Also, the school has like 3 official methods to send info (that is very confusing), but someone kindly repost all the info in the WA group.
Also, WA has a few aventajes: [1]
* If someone sends a message, they get angry if you don't reply in less than 5 minutes.
* If you realize something a Saturday at 11:30 pm, you can't send a WA about that, because the other person will think you expect them to get out of bed/party to reply.
* You can't mark a message as unread to reply it later or in a few days.
How much is "the vast majority"? I would say that one third of something global with potentially infinite number of providers, when the second player is probably a fraction of that, is already a pretty big majority.
I don't know exactly where to draw the line on "the vast majority," but surely it must be higher than the bar for a simple majority, which is "more than half." If you want to describe something in the lead but under the 50% mark, the word you're looking for is "plurality."
Yes indeed, both meanings are possible in most contexts.
In US English, when speaking with the mathematical precision, majority means absolute majority (more than half) and plurality means relative majority (more than anyone else). British English does also have the term relative majority like in French, though I don’t know if this is used in mathematics.
But like most other dictionaries in both English and French (with some exceptions like l’Académie Française’s dictionary), Merriam-Webster tries to describe how language is actually used in the real world and not some theoretical idea of how it should be used.
Therefore, since “majority” is often used to mean either absolute or relative majority when speaking in a less precise context than mathematics, a general-purpose dictionary like this one lists both meanings. A mathematical dictionary from the US (again I don’t know about the British equivalent) would list just the absolute meaning.
As an Australian English and Indian English speaker and a mathematician, I have never heard the word plurality outside of discussions of the US political system.
I have seen nitpicking on whether the word majority is the right word for a relative majority, but only seen plurality offered as an alternative by American English speakers who are also students of the American political system.
I would almost never expect anyone to say "the plurality of cars sold are Toyotas", for example.
> They don't have to own the servers and the pipes if they own all the clients, sources of revenue, distribution platforms and financial transaction systems.
They don't own all sources of revenue. Even on their major media platform they get siphoned off by companies like patreon. It is all a charade and not everyone is enamoured by that.
> how much of that does google/alphabet actually own?
A ton. They got shares in a bunch of submarine cables, their properties (YouTube, Maps, Google Search) make up a wide share of Internet traffic, they are via Google Search the chief traffic source for most if not all websites, they own a large CDN as well as one of the three dominant hyperscalers...
> I wonder if "x-browser-copyright" is an attempt at trying to use the legal system to stifle competition and further their monopoly. If so, have they not heard of Sega v. Accolade ?
My first thought was the Nintendo logo used for Gameboy game attestation.
I wonder what a court would make of the copyright header. What original work is copyright being claimed for here? The HTTP request? If I used Chrome to POST this comment, would Google be claiming copyright over the POST request?
I can only assume it's the flawed logic that it's "reasonably secure, but shorter than sha256". Flawed because SHA1 is broken, and SHA256 is faster on most hardware, and you can just truncate your SHA256 output if you really want it to be shorter.
SHA-1 is broken for being used in digital signature algorithms or for any other application that requires collision resistance.
There are a lot of applications for which collision resistance is irrelevant and for which the use of SHA-1 is fine, for instance in some random number generators.
On the CPUs where I have tested this (with hardware instructions for both hashes, e.g. some Ryzen and some Aarch64), SHA-1 is faster than SHA-256, though the difference is not great.
In this case, collision resistance appears irrelevant. There is no point in finding other strings that will produce the same validation hash. The correct input strings can be obtained by reverse engineering anyway, which has been done by the author. Here the hash was used just for slight obfuscation.
The perf difference between SHA1 and SHA256 was marginal on the systems I tested (3950x, M1 Pro), which makes SHA256 a no-brainer to me if you're just picking between those two (collision resistance is nice to have even if you "don't need it").
You're right that collision resistance doesn't really matter here, but there's a fair chance SHA1 will end up deprecated or removed from whatever cryptography library you're using for it, at some point in the future.
When will CRC32c (also used in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame#Frame_check_seq... ), MD5, etc get removed? Sure they aren't supported for _security_ use, and should not be used by anything new. However the algorithms will likely continue to exist in libraries of some sort for the foreseeable future. Maybe someday in the distant future they'll just be part of a 'legacy / ancient hash and cryptography' library that isn't standard, but they'll continue to be around.
SO many things also already standardize on SHA1 (or even weaker hashes) as a (non-security) anti-collision hash for either sharding storage sets (host, folder, etc) or just as already well profiled hash key algos.
The difference that you've already noted here is that the X-Browser-Validation is new. It doesn't have to keep using SHA1, MD5 or CRC-32 to maintain compatibility with a protocol spec that predates the existence of newer algorithms.
The header is new, but what's it working with on the server side? Were there any other considerations for the selection of the value?
Though in contrast to that, sometimes the criteria is just that a given number of bits aren't useful, so the output of a different hash is truncated to the desired size.
Maybe part of the driving criteria os compatibility with E.G. the oldest supported Android version? Or maybe some version of Windows seen in legacy devices in poor countries? There might be good reasons beyond just 'header is new, everything must be state of the art'.
There’s also the downside of every engineer you onboard spending time raising the same concern, and being trained to ignore it. You want engineers to raise red flags when they see SHA-1!
Sometimes something that looks wrong is bad even if it’s technically acceptable.
Not just engineers. Many off-the-shelf static analysis tools would happily jump at every mention of a deprecated algorithm such as SHA1 in your code. It's just too much noise, and the performance cost of SHA-256 is negligible on modern computers. If digest size or speed on older machines is a concern, there are other options like Blake2/3.
There probably(?) isn't any serious vulnerability in using SHA-1 for an integrity identifier that is based on a hard-coded "API key", but I think algorithm hygiene is always a good thing. You don't want to train your engineers to use broken algorithms like SHA-1, "because it might be ok, idk".
It should be noted that using a parallelizable hash, like Blake2/3, does not provide higher speed by magic.
Evaluating anything in parallel is a different compromise between the time and the power needed to perform a computation, i.e. with an N-way parallel evaluation you hope to reduce the time by almost N times, while increasing the power by a similar factor and not increasing much the energy required to do the computation.
The time to compute a hash is not always the most important, especially when the hash computation can be overlapped with other data processing. In mobile and embedded applications the energy can be more important. In that case using the hardware instructions for SHA-256 or SHA-1 can provide energy savings over hashes like Blake2/3.
So the best choice for a hash function can be affected by many factors, it is preferable not to choose automatically the same function regardless of the circumstances.
Nowadays SHA-256 is widely supported in hardware and still secure enough for any application with an 128-bit security target, so it is OK as a default choice, but it may be not the best choice in many cases.
My mind went here immediately as well, but some details are subtly different. For example being a remote service instead of a locally-executed copy of software, Google could argue that they are materially relying on such representation to provide any service at all. Or that without access to the service's code, someone cannot prove this string is required in order to interoperate. It also wouldn't be the first time the current Supreme Court took advantage of slightly differing details as an excuse to reject longstanding precedent in favor of fascism.
If anything, the EU is even more likely to consider it fair use for interoperability, which basically leaves Asia --- but Google's services are blocked in the biggest country there, so I'm not sure about that.
They might be trying to do this in the US given the political climate, but then again, the current administration is decidedly unfriendly towards Big Tech in general.
Probably any cryptographic hash function would have done.
My suspicion is that what they're trying to do here is similar to e.g. the "Readium LCP" DRM for ebooks (previously discussed at [1]): A "secret key" and a "proprietary algorithm" might possibly bring this into DMCA scope in a way that using only a copyrighted string might not.
I have to imagine Google added these headers to make it easier for them to identify agentic requests vs human requests. What angers me is that this is yet another signal that can be used to uniquely fingerprint users.
It doesn't really meaningfully increase the fingerprinting surface. As the OP mentioned the hash is generated from constants that are the same for all chrome builds. The only thing it really does is help distinguish chrome from other chromium forks (eg. edge or brave), but there's already enough proprietary bits inside chrome that you can easily tell it apart.
> The only thing it really does is help distinguish chrome from other chromium forks (eg. edge or brave)
You could already do that with the user agent string. What this does is distinguishes between chrome and something else pretending to be chrome. Like say a firefox user who is spoofing a chrome user agent on a site that blocks, or reduces functionality for the firefox user agent.
Plenty of bots pretend to be Chrome via user agent, but if you look closely are actually running Headless Chromium. This is a very useful signal for fraud and abuse prevention.
Let's ignore for the moment that this has been reverse engineered.
If they only look at this header, then legitimate users using non-chrome browsers will get treated as bots.
If the these headers are only used for chrome user agents, then it would be easy to bypass by using headless chromium with a user agent that spoofs firefox or safari.
This is what I don't get. Anybody scraping at scale is using headful browsers as fallback, this does nothing. I will just find the browser that works, and use it.
I spoof User Agent, TLS/browser fingerprinting all day. These are the basics. None of this bothers me tbh, I'm constantly running tests on lots of versions chrome, firefox and brave and haven't really seen any impact in bot detection. I do a lot of browser emulation of other browsers in Chrome. PermiterX/Human seems to be the only WAF that is really good about catching this.
I'm more concerned that whether intentional or not this will probably cause problems for users who use non-chrome browsers. Like say slowing down requests that don't have this header, responding with different content, etc.
User-agent discrimination is tolerable when it's Joe Webmaster doing it out of ignorance. It is not acceptable if it is being used by a company leveraging their dominant position in one market to gain an advantage over its competitors in another market. It's not acceptable even if it's not said company's expressed intent to do so but merely a "happy accident" that is getting "overlooked".
Indeed, even for those who require a round of mental gymnastics before they concede that monopolies are, like, "bad" or whatever, GP points out precisely how this would constitute "consumer harm".
Tell that to Google intentionally slowing down Firefox even without ad blocking. (I'm talking about them using the fallback for web components instead, not the slowdowns when ads don't load.)
How does that work, though? I have a bunch of automated tasks I use to speed up my workflows, but they all run on top of the regular browser that I also use. I don't see how this war is winnable? (not without tracking things like micro-movements of the mouse that might be caused by being a human etc)
The same policies also offer the ability to force-install an official Google "Endpoint Verification" chrome extension which validates browser/OS integrity using Enterprise Chrome Extension APIs ("chrome.enterprise") [0] only available in force-installed enterprise extensions.
FWIW, in my years of managing enterprise chrome deployments, I haven't come across the feature to force people to use Chrome (there are a lot of settings, maybe I've missed this one). But, there definitely is the ability to prevent users from mixing their work and non-work gmail accounts in the same chrome profile.
Edit: Okay, maybe one hole in my logic is the first-sign in experience. When signing into google for the first time in a new chrome browser, the force-installed extension wouldn't be there yet. Although Google could hypothetically still allow the login initially, but then abort/cancel the sign in process as part of the login flow if the extension doesn't sync and install (indicating non-chrome use).
This might be their “context aware” security feature. Which can prevent access to certain things based on device, browser, etc.
I don’t see why any of that can’t rely on a chrome extension implementation using the privileged APIs to verify OS, Browser, etc. Struggling to understand why they need special headers for any of this functionality.
Why would they think this was a good idea after losing the chrome anti-trust trial? I don't know the intended purpose is for this, but I can see several ways this could be used anti-competitive way, although now it has been reverse engineered, an extension could spoof it. On the other hand, I wonder if they intend to claim the header is a form of DRM and such spoofing is a DMCA violation...
x-browser-copyright seems like an attempt at something similar to the Gameboy's nintendo-logo DRM (wherein cartridges are required to have the nintendo logo bitmap before they can boot, so any unlicensed carts would be trademark infringement)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sega_Enterprises_Ltd._v._Accola... is the legal precedent that says trying to do that won't work, but then again maybe Google thinks it's invincible and can do whatever it wants after it ironically defeated Oracle in a case about interoperability and copyright.
Apple famously does this with this word soup in their SMC chips, and proceeded to bankrupt a company that sold Hackintoshes and shipped it in their EFI: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psystar_Corporation
Our hard work
by these words guarded
please don't steal
(c) Apple Computer Inc
Though one could argue that they would have probably bankrupted them anyway even if they hadn't done that.
not if they make it dynamic somehow (e.g. include current day in hash). Then with MV3 changes that prevent dynamic header manipulation there is no way for an extension to spoof it.
I think it’s difficult to argue that Google doesn’t have the right and capability to build their own private internet, I just also think they’d like to make the entire internet their own private internet, and do away with the public internet, and I’d really prefer they not do that.
Not really. It's just an API key + the user agent. There is no mechanism to detect the browser hasn't been tampered with. If you wanted to do that you'd at least include a hash over the browser binary, or better yet the in-memory application binary.
That would provide not extra capability. Anybody smart enough to modify the chrome executable could just patch the hash generation to also return a static (but correct) hash.
Is an "api key" like this covered by copyright? Would that technically mean that spoofing this random sequence of numbers would require me to agree to whatever source license they offer it under, since I wouldn't know the random sequence unless I read it in their source?
Anti-reverse-engineering clauses in EULAs are limited and exceptions are always present for interoperability. The same goes for copyright. It's hard to argue that this key is secret if it's widely and publicly distributed.
Ironically, Google just fought with Oracle a case around similar concepts.
At this point I am fully convinced that Google is abusing Chrome's dominant position to push their own agenda and shape the whole Internet the way they want. Privacy sandbox, manifest v3, you name it.
Sadly nobody can do anything about it, so far. We'll yet need to see the outcome of the antitrust trial.
It's not all that small, although probably small enough to make a rainbow table or something.
You would have to maintain the code to generate character-perfect strings (or maybe just keep a very large library of the current most popular ones) and also make sure you have the up to date API key salt values (which they probably going to start rotating regularly), which–as I said before–wouldn't be impossible, just prohibitively irritating to maintain for comparatively little benefit.
And besides, it won't be too long before people just start spoofing the hash too, probably shorter than getting the generator up and running
Dug into chrome.dll and figured out how the x-browser-validation header is generated. Full write up and PoC code here: https://github.com/dsekz/chrome-x-browser-validation-header
Why do you think Chrome bothers with this extra headers. Anti-spoofing, bot detection, integrity or something else?
Making it easier to reject "unapproved" or "unsupported" browsers and take away user freedom. Trying to make it harder for other browsers to compete.
That can be done already based on User-Agent, though. Other browsers don't spoof their agent strings to look like Chrome, and never have (or, they do, but only in the sense that everyone still claims to be Mozilla). And browsers have always (for obvious reasons) been very happy to identify themselves correctly to backend sites.
The purpose here is surely to detect sophisticated spoofing by non-user-browser software, like crawlers and robots. Robots are in fact required by the net's Geneva Convention equivalent to identify themselves and respect limitations, but obviously many don't.
I have a hard time understanding robot detection as an issue of "user freedom" or "browser competition".
>I have a hard time understanding robot detection as an issue of "user freedom" or "browser competition".
The big one is that running a browser other than Chrome (or Safari) could come to mean endless captchas, degrading the experience. "Chrome doesn't have as many captchas" is a pretty good hook.
Not to mention how often you can get stuck in an infinite loop where it just will not accept your captcha results and keeps making you do it over and over. Especially if you’re using a VPN. It’s maddening sometimes. Can’t even do a basic search
So the market isn't allowed to detect robots because some sites have bad captcha implementations? I'm not following. Captchas aren't implement by the browser.
> So the market isn't allowed to detect robots (...)
I don't know what you mean by "the market".
What I do know is that if I try to go to a site with my favourite browser and a site blocks me because it's so poorly engineered it thinks I am a bot just because I'm not using Chrome, then it's pretty obvious that it's not detecting bots.
Also worth noting: it might surprise you that there browser automation frameworks. Some of them, such as Selenium, support Chrome.
So the cool thing is we can now add an x-browser-validation header to selenium (and firefox).
Exactly
I’m not sure who “the market” is in this case, but reCAPTCHA is owned and implemented by Google and clearly favors their browser. Any attempts to use other browsers or obfuscate your digital footprint in the slightest leads to all kinds of headaches. It’s a very convenient side effect of their “anti-bot” efforts that they have every incentive to steer in to.
This isn't Google's doing but Mozilla's. Firefox's strict tracking protection blocks third-party cookies. The site you're trying to visit isn't hosting reCAPTCHA itself; reCAPTCHA was loaded from a third-party origin (Google); so the cookie that Google sets saying you passed the CAPTCHA is blocked by Firefox.
You can add an exception in Firefox's settings to allow third-party cookies for CAPTCHAs. Google's reCAPTCHA cookie is set by "recaptcha.net", and CloudFlare's CAPTCHA has exactly the same problem, whose domain is "challenges.cloudflare.com".
If the cookies aren't set and passed back, then they can't know that you've solved it, so you get another one.
You're blaming Mozilla because they fixed a security vulnerability, and then saying that the workaround is to reenable the vulnerability so that Google can continue surveilling.
Yet for some inexplicable reason all the other bot detection methods I encounter online don’t struggle at all with me and don’t stick me in infinite loops. Cloudflare for instance simply does not bug out with rare exceptions for me.
Maybe my experience is atypical but it seems to me this is a reCAPTCHA problem, not a Mozilla one. It’s Google’s problem. I imagine they can solve this but simply don’t want to.
Maybe I’m wrong but again, i encounter more issues with their “anti bot” methods than any other by a massive margin.
Concretely: Google meet blocks all sorts of browsers / private tabs with a vague: “you cannot join this meeting” error. They let mainstream ones in though.
I use Safari (admittedly, with Private Cloud and a few tracking-blocking extensions) and get bombarded with Cloudflare's 'prove you are human' checkbox several times an hour.
It's already a pretty degraded experience.
I mean you're using a VPN, they can't tell the diff between you and a bunch of bots
Requests per second?
Harder to scale, stateful.
I think you mean they can't profit from selling data from a bunch of bots.
> I have a hard time understanding robot detection as an issue of "user freedom" or "browser competition".
In the name of robot detection, you can lock down device, require device attestation, prevent users from running non-standard devices/OS/software, prevent them from accessing websites (CloudFlare dislikes non-chrome browser and hates non-standard browsers, ReCaptcha blocks you out if you're not on Chrome-like/Safari/Firefox). Web Environment Integrity[1] is also a good example of where robot detection ends up affecting the end user.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_Environment_Integrity
Aren't all those solutions even more impactful on the user experience though? Someone who cares about user freedom would think they're even worse, no?
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The purpose here isn't to deal with sophisticated spoofing. This is setting a couple of headers to fixed and easily discoverable values. It wouldn't stop a teenager with Curl, let along a sophisticated adversary. There's no counter-abuse value here at all.
It's quite hard to figure out what this is for, because the mechanism is so incredibly weak. Either it was implemented by some total idiots who did not bother talking at all to the thousands of people with counter-abuse experience that work at Google, or it is meant for some incredibly specific case where they think the copyright string actually provides a deterrent.
(If I had to guess, it's about protecting server APIs only meant for use by the Chrome browser, not about protecting any kind of interactive services used directly by end-users.)
I would imagine that this serves the same purpose as the way that early home consoles would check the inserted cartridge to see that it had a specific copyright message in it, because then you can't reproduce that message without violating the copyright.
In this case, you would need to reproduce a message that explicitly states that it's Google's copyright, and that you don't have the right to copy it ("All rights reserved."). Doing that might then give Google the legal evidence it needs to sue you.
In other words, a legal deterrence rather than a technical one.
It's easy to change the User Agent and we cannot handwave this fact away for the sake of argument.
> Why do you think Chrome bothers with this extra headers. Anti-spoofing, bot detection, integrity or something else?
Bot detection. It's a menace to literally everyone. Not to piss anyone off, but if you haven't dealt with it, you don't have anything of value to scrape or get access to.
> Bot detection. It's a menace to literally everyone. Not to piss anyone off, but if you haven't dealt with it, you don't have anything of value to scrape or get access to.
What leads you to believe that bit developers are unable to set a request header?
They managed fine to set Chrome's user agent. Why do you think something like X-Browser-Validation is off limits?
Because you would need to reproduce an explicit Google copyright statement which states that you don't have the right to copy it ("All rights reserved.") in order to do it fully.
That presumably gives Google the legal ammunition it needs to sue you if you do it.
Companies like SEGA have tried doing stuff like that in the past, and lost.
It seems like the requirement to reproduce this copyright header alone, nevermind the validation hash, would be enough to scare off scrapers?
I'm no lawyer, but my take on it is that by reproducing this particular value for the validation header, you are stating that you are the Chrome browser. It's likely that this has been implemented in such a way that other browsers could use it too if they so choose; the expected contents of the copyright header can then change depending on what you have in the validation header.
To me, it seems likely that the spec is for a legally defensible User-Agent header.
> They managed fine to set Chrome's user agent. Why do you think something like X-Browser-Validation is off limits?
It's not off-limits technically. But do you think it'll remain this simple going forward? I doubt that.
Do you mean bot and non-Chrome-using human detection?
Bots can easily copy the header though so I don't see how that helps?
Only if they know to implement it and while it uses a more trivial approach. I expect it to become increasingly difficult gradually. It's also yet another way to make mistakes and make it entirely obvious that one is forging Chrome.
Bullshit. You don't have anything of value either. Scrapers will ram through _anything_, and figure out if it's useful later.
Seems like they are using these headers only for google.com requests.
Yes I think it is part of their multi level testing of for new version rollouts. In addition to all the internal unit and performance tests, they want an extra level of verification that weird things aren't happening in the wild
They probably are using it to block bots scraping Google results is my theory
I have two questions:
1. Do I understand it correctly and the validation header is individual for each installation?
2. Is this header only in Google Chrome or also in Chromium?
>1. Do I understand it correctly and the validation header is individual for each installation?
I'm not sure how you got that impression. It's generated from fixed constants.
https://github.com/dsekz/chrome-x-browser-validation-header?...
It's still not clear to me because it's called the default API key. And for me, default means that this is normally overwritten. And if overwritten, during build or during install? That's what I'm asking myself.
I had the same question (2). https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44560664
If it's only in the closed-source Chrome, then it seems it's intended to help Google's servers distinguish between Google's own products and others.
But I've never seen a Google site which worked less-well in Chromium than in Chrome, so I'm somewhat skeptical of this. Perhaps there are exceptions
Is it not likely that it protects against AI bot Llama?
I don't see how you can "protect" against a large language model that cannot do browsing.
This should be somewhat alarming to anyone who already knows about WEI.
I wonder if "x-browser-copyright" is an attempt at trying to use the legal system to stifle competition and further their monopoly. If so, have they not heard of Sega v. Accolade ?
I'm a bit amused that they're using SHA-1. Why not MD5, CRC32, or (as the dumb security scanners would recommend) even SHA256?
I am also alarmed. Google has to split off its development of both Chrome and Android now, this crazy vertical integration is akin to a private company building and owning both the roads AND the cars. Sure, you can build other cars, but we just need to verify that your tires are safe before you can drive on OUR roads. It's fine as long as you build your car on our complete frame, you can still choose whatever color you like! Also, the car has ads.
Ok but The Road is the internet, how much of that does google/alphabet actually own?
All of YouTube. The vast majority of email. All sources of revenue for ad-funded sites, basically, except for those ads pushed by Meta in their respective walled gardens. They are also the gatekeepers deciding what parts of the internet the users actually see, and they continuously work towards preventing people from actually visiting other sites by siphoning off information and keeping users on Google (AMP, AI summaries). The whole Play Store ecosystem is a walled garden which pretends to be open by building on an ostensibly open source OS but adding strict integrity checks on top which gives Google the ultimate power to decide what is allowed to run on peoples phones.
They don't have to own the servers and the pipes if they own all the clients, sources of revenue, distribution platforms and financial transaction systems.
The rest of your list is irrealistic but I had to react at least to this one :
> The vast majority of email.
Not even close, less than a third in reality
I agree that google should be cut down, but if done then other tech giant should be too, otherwise we're just trading one master for another
Even less than a third is absolutely massive on the scale of a protocol like E-mail.
Oh I am not saying they're not a gigantic provider, I'm saying less than a third is very far from "the vast majority" and exageration and misinformation help no one's case, be they on purpose or due to lack of knowledge.
I would shy away from calling them a majority myself, but it’s a fair point.
Remember that email involves at least two parties. It doesn’t matter if I use a non-Google provider, I still have to follow all of Google’s email rules, or email will be useless to me because I wouldn’t be able to send mail to Gmail or Google Workspace users.
In a practical sense, Google have very direct control over almost all email.
They're probably the biggest provider in existence.
I myself would bet on microsoft
I was being a bit generous. I did the research. Google has 1.8 billion active users. They're the biggest.
In the math department, we had a Moodle the students in the first year of my university in Argentina.
When we started like 15 years ago, the emails of the students and TA were evenly split in 30% Gmail, 30% Yahoo!, 30% Hotmail and 10% others (very aproxímate numbers).
Now the students have like 80% Gmail, 10% Live/Outlook/Hotmail and 10% others/Yahoo. Some of the TA are much older, so perhaps "only" 50% use Gmail.
The difference is huge. I blame the mandatory gmail account for the cell phone.
Anyway, we had weird problems with Live/Outlook/Hotmail and Yahoo because they classified some of our emails as spam. Gmail usually works better.
Anyway^2, everyone is using WhatsApp, so it doesn't matter.
In what way would you consider WhatsApp a replacement for email? Instant messaging is a completely different use case.
Not for everyone.
Anyway, I got asked to provide a "real" email address by support at my mobile provider.
I gave them a yahoo email.
Here, for a lot of profesional (from medical doctors to plumbers) the only contact is a WhatsApp numbers, no email, no real phone.
At work, 70% of the messages are by WhatsApp. We have like 10 buildings distributed in a 3 million person city, like 3 miles away from each other. So there is a lot of global coordination (mostly by WA). Also inside each building each subgroup of TA (like Algebra+Monday-Thursday+Morning) has one WA group, and the students have an unofficial WA per course.
We even have a WA group for the "HOA" of my home. (It's an apartment.) People can't maintain a mailing list or use CC correctly, but can use WA.
And there is another WA for the parents in each course of my children in primary school. Everything is discussed there, in particular invitations to birthday parties. Also, the school has like 3 official methods to send info (that is very confusing), but someone kindly repost all the info in the WA group.
Also, WA has a few aventajes: [1]
* If someone sends a message, they get angry if you don't reply in less than 5 minutes.
* If you realize something a Saturday at 11:30 pm, you can't send a WA about that, because the other person will think you expect them to get out of bed/party to reply.
* You can't mark a message as unread to reply it later or in a few days.
* It's even more centralized than email
[1] /s
How much is "the vast majority"? I would say that one third of something global with potentially infinite number of providers, when the second player is probably a fraction of that, is already a pretty big majority.
I don't know exactly where to draw the line on "the vast majority," but surely it must be higher than the bar for a simple majority, which is "more than half." If you want to describe something in the lead but under the 50% mark, the word you're looking for is "plurality."
In French it's not the case, you can have relative or absolute majority, which might explain my confusion.
According to this definition https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/majority : "c : the greater quantity or share" that also seems to be a possible meaning in English
Yes indeed, both meanings are possible in most contexts.
In US English, when speaking with the mathematical precision, majority means absolute majority (more than half) and plurality means relative majority (more than anyone else). British English does also have the term relative majority like in French, though I don’t know if this is used in mathematics.
But like most other dictionaries in both English and French (with some exceptions like l’Académie Française’s dictionary), Merriam-Webster tries to describe how language is actually used in the real world and not some theoretical idea of how it should be used.
Therefore, since “majority” is often used to mean either absolute or relative majority when speaking in a less precise context than mathematics, a general-purpose dictionary like this one lists both meanings. A mathematical dictionary from the US (again I don’t know about the British equivalent) would list just the absolute meaning.
As an Australian English and Indian English speaker and a mathematician, I have never heard the word plurality outside of discussions of the US political system.
I have seen nitpicking on whether the word majority is the right word for a relative majority, but only seen plurality offered as an alternative by American English speakers who are also students of the American political system.
I would almost never expect anyone to say "the plurality of cars sold are Toyotas", for example.
> They don't have to own the servers and the pipes if they own all the clients, sources of revenue, distribution platforms and financial transaction systems.
They don't own all sources of revenue. Even on their major media platform they get siphoned off by companies like patreon. It is all a charade and not everyone is enamoured by that.
> how much of that does google/alphabet actually own?
A ton. They got shares in a bunch of submarine cables, their properties (YouTube, Maps, Google Search) make up a wide share of Internet traffic, they are via Google Search the chief traffic source for most if not all websites, they own a large CDN as well as one of the three dominant hyperscalers...
> I wonder if "x-browser-copyright" is an attempt at trying to use the legal system to stifle competition and further their monopoly. If so, have they not heard of Sega v. Accolade ?
My first thought was the Nintendo logo used for Gameboy game attestation.
I wonder what a court would make of the copyright header. What original work is copyright being claimed for here? The HTTP request? If I used Chrome to POST this comment, would Google be claiming copyright over the POST request?
com.apple.Dont_Steal_Mac_OS_X
SHA-1 is a head-scratcher for sure.
I can only assume it's the flawed logic that it's "reasonably secure, but shorter than sha256". Flawed because SHA1 is broken, and SHA256 is faster on most hardware, and you can just truncate your SHA256 output if you really want it to be shorter.
SHA-1 is broken for being used in digital signature algorithms or for any other application that requires collision resistance.
There are a lot of applications for which collision resistance is irrelevant and for which the use of SHA-1 is fine, for instance in some random number generators.
On the CPUs where I have tested this (with hardware instructions for both hashes, e.g. some Ryzen and some Aarch64), SHA-1 is faster than SHA-256, though the difference is not great.
In this case, collision resistance appears irrelevant. There is no point in finding other strings that will produce the same validation hash. The correct input strings can be obtained by reverse engineering anyway, which has been done by the author. Here the hash was used just for slight obfuscation.
The perf difference between SHA1 and SHA256 was marginal on the systems I tested (3950x, M1 Pro), which makes SHA256 a no-brainer to me if you're just picking between those two (collision resistance is nice to have even if you "don't need it").
You're right that collision resistance doesn't really matter here, but there's a fair chance SHA1 will end up deprecated or removed from whatever cryptography library you're using for it, at some point in the future.
When will CRC32c (also used in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_frame#Frame_check_seq... ), MD5, etc get removed? Sure they aren't supported for _security_ use, and should not be used by anything new. However the algorithms will likely continue to exist in libraries of some sort for the foreseeable future. Maybe someday in the distant future they'll just be part of a 'legacy / ancient hash and cryptography' library that isn't standard, but they'll continue to be around.
SO many things also already standardize on SHA1 (or even weaker hashes) as a (non-security) anti-collision hash for either sharding storage sets (host, folder, etc) or just as already well profiled hash key algos.
CRC was never a cryptographic hash so there is no need to deprecate it.
MD5 (and SHA1) is already absent or deprecated in many cryptography libraries, e.g. https://cryptography.io/en/latest/hazmat/primitives/cryptogr...
Every time someone uses MD5 or SHA1 for something that isn't legacy-backcompat, they further delay their deprecation/removal unnecessarily.
The difference that you've already noted here is that the X-Browser-Validation is new. It doesn't have to keep using SHA1, MD5 or CRC-32 to maintain compatibility with a protocol spec that predates the existence of newer algorithms.
The header is new, but what's it working with on the server side? Were there any other considerations for the selection of the value?
Though in contrast to that, sometimes the criteria is just that a given number of bits aren't useful, so the output of a different hash is truncated to the desired size.
Maybe part of the driving criteria os compatibility with E.G. the oldest supported Android version? Or maybe some version of Windows seen in legacy devices in poor countries? There might be good reasons beyond just 'header is new, everything must be state of the art'.
There’s also the downside of every engineer you onboard spending time raising the same concern, and being trained to ignore it. You want engineers to raise red flags when they see SHA-1!
Sometimes something that looks wrong is bad even if it’s technically acceptable.
Not just engineers. Many off-the-shelf static analysis tools would happily jump at every mention of a deprecated algorithm such as SHA1 in your code. It's just too much noise, and the performance cost of SHA-256 is negligible on modern computers. If digest size or speed on older machines is a concern, there are other options like Blake2/3.
There probably(?) isn't any serious vulnerability in using SHA-1 for an integrity identifier that is based on a hard-coded "API key", but I think algorithm hygiene is always a good thing. You don't want to train your engineers to use broken algorithms like SHA-1, "because it might be ok, idk".
It should be noted that using a parallelizable hash, like Blake2/3, does not provide higher speed by magic.
Evaluating anything in parallel is a different compromise between the time and the power needed to perform a computation, i.e. with an N-way parallel evaluation you hope to reduce the time by almost N times, while increasing the power by a similar factor and not increasing much the energy required to do the computation.
The time to compute a hash is not always the most important, especially when the hash computation can be overlapped with other data processing. In mobile and embedded applications the energy can be more important. In that case using the hardware instructions for SHA-256 or SHA-1 can provide energy savings over hashes like Blake2/3.
So the best choice for a hash function can be affected by many factors, it is preferable not to choose automatically the same function regardless of the circumstances.
Nowadays SHA-256 is widely supported in hardware and still secure enough for any application with an 128-bit security target, so it is OK as a default choice, but it may be not the best choice in many cases.
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> have they not heard of Sega v. Accolade ?
My mind went here immediately as well, but some details are subtly different. For example being a remote service instead of a locally-executed copy of software, Google could argue that they are materially relying on such representation to provide any service at all. Or that without access to the service's code, someone cannot prove this string is required in order to interoperate. It also wouldn't be the first time the current Supreme Court took advantage of slightly differing details as an excuse to reject longstanding precedent in favor of fascism.
And even if it falls under fair use in the US, they could still have a case in some other relevant market. The world is a big place
If anything, the EU is even more likely to consider it fair use for interoperability, which basically leaves Asia --- but Google's services are blocked in the biggest country there, so I'm not sure about that.
They might be trying to do this in the US given the political climate, but then again, the current administration is decidedly unfriendly towards Big Tech in general.
WEI? As in Windows Experience Index? Can you elaborate?
Web Environment Integrity: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_Environment_Integrity
Probably any cryptographic hash function would have done.
My suspicion is that what they're trying to do here is similar to e.g. the "Readium LCP" DRM for ebooks (previously discussed at [1]): A "secret key" and a "proprietary algorithm" might possibly bring this into DMCA scope in a way that using only a copyrighted string might not.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43378627
I have to imagine Google added these headers to make it easier for them to identify agentic requests vs human requests. What angers me is that this is yet another signal that can be used to uniquely fingerprint users.
It doesn't really meaningfully increase the fingerprinting surface. As the OP mentioned the hash is generated from constants that are the same for all chrome builds. The only thing it really does is help distinguish chrome from other chromium forks (eg. edge or brave), but there's already enough proprietary bits inside chrome that you can easily tell it apart.
> The only thing it really does is help distinguish chrome from other chromium forks (eg. edge or brave)
You could already do that with the user agent string. What this does is distinguishes between chrome and something else pretending to be chrome. Like say a firefox user who is spoofing a chrome user agent on a site that blocks, or reduces functionality for the firefox user agent.
Plenty of bots pretend to be Chrome via user agent, but if you look closely are actually running Headless Chromium. This is a very useful signal for fraud and abuse prevention.
> This is a very useful signal for fraud and abuse prevention.
Like people spoofing the Chrome UA in Firefox to avoid artificial performance degradation inflicted by Google on their websites...
Let's ignore for the moment that this has been reverse engineered.
If they only look at this header, then legitimate users using non-chrome browsers will get treated as bots.
If the these headers are only used for chrome user agents, then it would be easy to bypass by using headless chromium with a user agent that spoofs firefox or safari.
This is what I don't get. Anybody scraping at scale is using headful browsers as fallback, this does nothing. I will just find the browser that works, and use it.
I spoof User Agent, TLS/browser fingerprinting all day. These are the basics. None of this bothers me tbh, I'm constantly running tests on lots of versions chrome, firefox and brave and haven't really seen any impact in bot detection. I do a lot of browser emulation of other browsers in Chrome. PermiterX/Human seems to be the only WAF that is really good about catching this.
I'm more concerned that whether intentional or not this will probably cause problems for users who use non-chrome browsers. Like say slowing down requests that don't have this header, responding with different content, etc.
User-agent discrimination has been happening for literally decades at this point, but you're right that this could make things worse.
User-agent discrimination is tolerable when it's Joe Webmaster doing it out of ignorance. It is not acceptable if it is being used by a company leveraging their dominant position in one market to gain an advantage over its competitors in another market. It's not acceptable even if it's not said company's expressed intent to do so but merely a "happy accident" that is getting "overlooked".
Indeed, even for those who require a round of mental gymnastics before they concede that monopolies are, like, "bad" or whatever, GP points out precisely how this would constitute "consumer harm".
Tell that to Google intentionally slowing down Firefox even without ad blocking. (I'm talking about them using the fallback for web components instead, not the slowdowns when ads don't load.)
How does that work, though? I have a bunch of automated tasks I use to speed up my workflows, but they all run on top of the regular browser that I also use. I don't see how this war is winnable? (not without tracking things like micro-movements of the mouse that might be caused by being a human etc)
FYI: Google enterprise workspace admins can enable policies which e.g. prevent login ability to google.com properties to only Chrome browsers.
I wonder if this is header is not connected in some way to that feature.
Seems unnecessary.
The same policies also offer the ability to force-install an official Google "Endpoint Verification" chrome extension which validates browser/OS integrity using Enterprise Chrome Extension APIs ("chrome.enterprise") [0] only available in force-installed enterprise extensions.
FWIW, in my years of managing enterprise chrome deployments, I haven't come across the feature to force people to use Chrome (there are a lot of settings, maybe I've missed this one). But, there definitely is the ability to prevent users from mixing their work and non-work gmail accounts in the same chrome profile.
[0] https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/api/e...
Edit: Okay, maybe one hole in my logic is the first-sign in experience. When signing into google for the first time in a new chrome browser, the force-installed extension wouldn't be there yet. Although Google could hypothetically still allow the login initially, but then abort/cancel the sign in process as part of the login flow if the extension doesn't sync and install (indicating non-chrome use).
In my current job we do have force-Chrome setting enabled. I can't log in to Gmail through any other browser. Neither SSO login to GitHub via Google.
This might be their “context aware” security feature. Which can prevent access to certain things based on device, browser, etc.
I don’t see why any of that can’t rely on a chrome extension implementation using the privileged APIs to verify OS, Browser, etc. Struggling to understand why they need special headers for any of this functionality.
Why would they think this was a good idea after losing the chrome anti-trust trial? I don't know the intended purpose is for this, but I can see several ways this could be used anti-competitive way, although now it has been reverse engineered, an extension could spoof it. On the other hand, I wonder if they intend to claim the header is a form of DRM and such spoofing is a DMCA violation...
> after losing the chrome anti-trust trial?
There hasn't been such a trial.
x-browser-copyright seems like an attempt at something similar to the Gameboy's nintendo-logo DRM (wherein cartridges are required to have the nintendo logo bitmap before they can boot, so any unlicensed carts would be trademark infringement)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sega_Enterprises_Ltd._v._Accola... is the legal precedent that says trying to do that won't work, but then again maybe Google thinks it's invincible and can do whatever it wants after it ironically defeated Oracle in a case about interoperability and copyright.
Even if they can't defend it legally, it costs them ~nothing to add the header and it could still act as a deterrent.
Apple famously does this with this word soup in their SMC chips, and proceeded to bankrupt a company that sold Hackintoshes and shipped it in their EFI: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psystar_Corporation
Though one could argue that they would have probably bankrupted them anyway even if they hadn't done that.That was before the DMCA was passed. It's possible DMCA section 1201 could apply here.
>an extension could spoof it
not if they make it dynamic somehow (e.g. include current day in hash). Then with MV3 changes that prevent dynamic header manipulation there is no way for an extension to spoof it.
> Then with MV3 changes that prevent dynamic header manipulation
That doesn't apply to Firefox
Fair, I was considering chrome headless since firefox users are already served google captchas more often.
I think it’s difficult to argue that Google doesn’t have the right and capability to build their own private internet, I just also think they’d like to make the entire internet their own private internet, and do away with the public internet, and I’d really prefer they not do that.
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So this is basically hidden client attestation?
Not really. It's just an API key + the user agent. There is no mechanism to detect the browser hasn't been tampered with. If you wanted to do that you'd at least include a hash over the browser binary, or better yet the in-memory application binary.
That would provide not extra capability. Anybody smart enough to modify the chrome executable could just patch the hash generation to also return a static (but correct) hash.
Is an "api key" like this covered by copyright? Would that technically mean that spoofing this random sequence of numbers would require me to agree to whatever source license they offer it under, since I wouldn't know the random sequence unless I read it in their source?
That's an odd possibility.
Anti-reverse-engineering clauses in EULAs are limited and exceptions are always present for interoperability. The same goes for copyright. It's hard to argue that this key is secret if it's widely and publicly distributed.
Ironically, Google just fought with Oracle a case around similar concepts.
Does the open-source Chromium generate this header as well? (Perhaps with a slightly different UA as input.)
Or is it exclusive to the closed-source Chrome codebase?
And why should anyone with a sane mind (except for Googlers) allow this kind of validation bs to exist?
At this point I am fully convinced that Google is abusing Chrome's dominant position to push their own agenda and shape the whole Internet the way they want. Privacy sandbox, manifest v3, you name it.
Sadly nobody can do anything about it, so far. We'll yet need to see the outcome of the antitrust trial.
Two questions:
Which version of chrome is the first to implement these headers?
What are the potential effects of these headers on chromium forks, e.g. ungoogled chromium?
Well, what did you find out?
If you were using a user agent spoofing extension couldn't this be used to guess your "real" UA?
It looks like it's an SHA hash, so working backwards would probably be prohibitively irritating.
That's not how it works. The combination of valid inputs is a small set. You just try each one until you get the hash.
It's not all that small, although probably small enough to make a rainbow table or something.
You would have to maintain the code to generate character-perfect strings (or maybe just keep a very large library of the current most popular ones) and also make sure you have the up to date API key salt values (which they probably going to start rotating regularly), which–as I said before–wouldn't be impossible, just prohibitively irritating to maintain for comparatively little benefit.
And besides, it won't be too long before people just start spoofing the hash too, probably shorter than getting the generator up and running
There is no salt plus the list of api keys and user agents is finite and very short. Any computer could crack this header in milliseconds.
Is there a way to prevent Chrome from sending those headers?
How do I set this in Firefox?