Open nature of PC allowed for truly free/open source software to exist which can be functional without big corporate lockdown. I can fully assemble it with parts I can buy individually and as long as they are compatible (which is mentioned on the box, no hidden knowledge here) I can expect it to work within the mentioned warranty.
My PC based computers can be booted and fully functional with Debain, Fedora and (put your favorite Linux, BSD distro here mine is openSUSE Tumbleweed). There is no parallel ecosystem which yet, which rivals PC in terms of open specs and fully tinkerable hardware and software.
Macbooks are locked down with Apple and forget about your own hardware.
Android seemed like a competitor, but closed nature of its development and lack commodity hardware around ARM based phones means that FOSS layer exists only in user bases apps. We have custom ROMs which require bootable blobs from vendors and its non-reliable and breaks often.
It's common for people to assume that if IBM didn't use a simple, open architecture with off-the-shelf components for the original PC, then we'd never have had the PC ecosystem as we know it.
But this view neglects the fact that an organic ecosystem of interoperable open hardware converging to de facto standards and running a common OS already existed prior to IBM designing their PC. By 1980, there were already many independent vendors implementing their own variation on the 8080/S-100 design pioneered by MITS, all running CP/M from Digital Research.
When IBM released the PC, the CP/M world was still going strong. The fact that it was an easily cloneable architecture based on the 16-bit 8086 caused a lot of disruption, and led to the market dynamics that were already present in the 8080-S100-CP/M world pivoting over to x86-ISA-DOS.
If IBM had kept their PC proprietary, it might have led to a bit more fragmentation in the short-term market for business microcomputing, but at the same time, the CP/M world would have continued on without that disruption, and something else would have ultimately catalyzed the move to a common 16-bit architecture. DR was already working on CP/M-86 at the time IBM was developing the PC, after all.
Eventually, the same forces that led to the collapse of vertically integrated, proprietary platforms and the dominance of open-standards system builders would have asserted themselves, and IBM itself would still have been subdued by them. Modern computing would likely be in a similar position with or without IBM. The PC was a major ripple, but didn't really change the current.
You are right. We are lucky. A company like Digital could have made the PDP-11 into 'the PC' and lock it down from the beginning. IBM could have done the same if they had not been so incompetent. In such a case you would have Intel, IBM and Microsoft being a single organization that would have become to powerful.
We still had plenty of issue with Intel and Microsoft being able to play out their monopoly.
So I think it could have been a lot worse, but it could also have been a lot better.
I know of course, I'm love DEC history. But of course DEC Professional wasn't full compatible and cost far to much to be a Personal Computer. They closed down the bus also. It was more designed as Professional work station. And of course the famously released it with Rainbow and Decmade II. DEC had already lost by then.
Heathkit H11 was an opportunity but of course never followed up with.
> If they were not swimming in a pool of money this wouldn't happen.
Interestingly enough, Apple helped to develop a version of Linux running on the Mach microkernel, and handed out thousands of MkLinux CDs at WWDC and MacWorld Boston in 1996. Macs have been running Linux in various ways ever since.
Windows has also been running on intel Macs since Boot Camp in 2007. It remains to be seen whether ARM Windows will ever run natively on Apple Silicon however.
What do you suppose they would do? Seems to me that once the hardware is out there someone determined enough can find a way, no? I don’t see how this would affect their bottom line negatively either… hell, if they officially supported Linux I’m sure their hardware sales would do even better!
lol I remember years ago, people complained so much about "Wintel." And while I'm currently in the Linux+AMD camp, Intel and Windows are still far more open than any ARM+Android/iOS/anything world
Microsoft has been a decent enough steward of the x86 PC standard and the qualification test suite that defines it. If they are smart (which isn't necessarily guaranteed) and with enough pressure from industry and anti-competitiveness regulators to not close it off, they would probably be an adequate steward of a ARM PC standard as well.
The market is already full of ARM development boards that are pretty powerful. Just need to scale these up and put some real power on them.
Put something with the power of an M series or a Graviton on these and you have the start of a great ARM PC market.
There's nothing inherently not-open about ARM, or at least it's no less open by nature than x86. The fact that most ARM devices are locked down is a secondary effect from most of them being phones.
RISC-V would be more open than either of these but it still lags on performance. I have a RISC-V board but it's kind of slow. Not terrible but wouldn't make a good PC for anything but basic uses.
> There's nothing inherently not-open about ARM, or at least it's no less open by nature than x86. The fact that most ARM devices are locked down is a secondary effect from most of them being phones.
I'd argue lack of something like ACPI to discover the device tree and memory map is why this impression exists. Besides the ARM CPUs not being socketed.
UEFI doesn't help with hardware discovery. ACPI does. Commonly with non-PC systems the hardware addresses are hard-coded and they need to be known by the OS somehow. Device trees are that and there are nonofficial ways of exposing them as a UEFI driver but it is nowhere as official as ACPI on PC systems.
Because OEM rather sell laptops with vertical integration, which are going to become the PC of the future, as the build your own desktop market keeps shrinking.
ironically, you should be thanking Apple that the IBM PC exists
The Apple II was an open system and IBM clearly took a lot of inspiration from the Apple II line. Look at the 5150 motherboard in the picture in the article and compare it to the motherboard from an Apple II+
Apple II was an open system in a sense. Apple published the schematics and ROM source code. But it didn't have well defined interfaces that developers respected. A lot of published software, including some of the most popular apps, made use of variables and entry points in "unofficial" ways. This made it impossible for Apple or anybody else to even know how it was being used, much less to write a compatible ROM or OS that was not an exact copy of the original.
And if an updated system were to break any published app, Apple would be blamed. There were apps, albeit only a few, that would not run on an Apple IIe, and I think, a few more that wouldn't run on a IIc.
There were some notable violations of published entry points in MS-DOS software, most notably the page locations of display memory, leading to the famous "640k barrier." But they weren't enough to dissuade developers from treating the PC as an "open enough" platform.
I doubt that developers felt a particular sense of morality about the DOS interface, that they didn't feel about Apple II, but only that the interface was good enough to use as-is.
The real important thing here, was the openly published interface, and mutual agreement among devs to respect that interface. I mean "open enough" and "mostly respect" of course.
And when people made Apple II clones, most of them (like the Franklin Ace series) got sued out of existence by Apple. Eventually true clean-room ROMs were created like for the Laser 128, but that was fairly late in the life-span of the Apple II.
I believe they were both "accidentally open" for similar reasons. Neither company produced the most important chips and components in the device itself. That meant that you could assemble a greater understanding of the device than even the manufacturer had and there was good incentive for putting this effort in the early days of computing.
Intentionally open. As noted above, Apple published schematics and ROM source code. IBM published system board schematics as well as the BIOS source code.
All computers which could be bought by individuals at that time were 'open systems', they usually came with a full set of hardware schematics and programming documentation, and sometimes even ROM listings. The Apple II was nothing special in that regard.
PC only got where it was thanks to the mistakes that made clones possible.
Everyone else, including other IBM offerings, were all about vertical integration.
It is no coincidence that nowadays with PC desktops being largely left to enthusiastics and gamers, OEMs are all doubling down on vertical integration across laptops and mobile devices, as means to recoup the thin margins that have come to be.
The original IBM PC was proprietary only in its BIOS. It was a mistake IBM regretted very soon and tried to fix with an PS/2 architecture, MCA bus, and even OS/2 operating system.
But Microsoft and the companies that made PC clones did everything to keep this "mistake" alive.
In fact, the openness of the PC platform is a historical accident. Other proprietary personal computer manufacturers (like Apple, Commodore and Atari) also never planned to create an open platform either. The closest thing was the 8-bit MSX platform, which was a Microsoft thing for the Japanese market, and it was very soon outdated.
Other than using COTS parts (incl. the CPU), the BIOS, while proprietary, was in a way the weakest link as far as cloning, since it established a ROM-based standardized hardware interface that isolated the OS from the hardware.
Companies like Compaq, and later Phoenix and AMI, were able to get around the proprietary nature of the BIOS by building clean-room BIOS clones that withstood IBM's legal challenges.
However, given the willingness of Microsoft (apparently with little IBM could do about it) to sell MS-DOS variants to others like Compaq, and later the emergence of MS-DOS clones like DR-DOS, it's not obvious that clones might not still have taken off without the unintentional assist of the standardized BIOS interface.
I wouldn't say the BIOS was the weakest link. It was really the only obstacle, albeit a weak one. Surely, the BIOS was clean-room reverse engineered very soon and after that, the PC-clone market just exploded.
However, if there were no BIOS, the thin hardware abstraction layer that the BIOS provided would be part of MS-DOS. I see only two historical alternatives from that:
1. Microsoft would have had an even greater upper hand in controlling the PC market.
2. IBM could have kept the BIOS proprietary (even though as a part of MS DOS), which prevented Microsoft from selling MS-DOS independently with an IBM PC abstraction layer.
However, even if option 2 prevailed, Microsoft could have created its own BIOS to ensure that software written for MS-DOS would be compatible across the PC clone market.
There’s a lot, lot more to a PC being standard than the BIOS API. Attempts like the Tandy 2000 showed that hardware that deviated too much couldn’t run the same software and failed.
Of course, but it confers the same advantage to the clone maker that it did to IBM, which is why it might be regarded as a weakness in terms of preventing clones (although I've no idea if that was something that IBM was anticipating).
You mean like publishing the system board schematics and a full source listing for the BIOS?
That seems to have been surprisingly normal for PCs in the late 1970s.
Apple also published schematics and listings, and had to deal with clones, but Apple 2 clones weren't particularly useful without a copy of (or compatible replacement for) Apple's ROM, which Apple did not license.
I think the big change over the past 17 years has been the app stores (and on the less 'personal' computer side businesses will be on support contracts), the from the manufacturers point of view hardware and software is a loss leader to try and funnel users to where they do as much computer related commerce through their middle-man. In some ways it's an evolution of bundling software where that would be another source of income.
In 1990, everyone on my higschool that had access to computers was distributed between Spectrum, Atari ST, Amiga, and PCs, with PCs being the minority.
Personally I only moved into PCs in 1991, with a 386SX.
Until then, I only used the PC1512 ones on the school lab.
Feel free to look at the data. Yes, in Europe Amiga and ST had ok sales, specially at home and mostly for games. But they had almost non in the US, the biggest market, and same in Japan.
Because in Iberian Penisula, it was full of green phosphor terminals into timesharing systems, and random 16 bit computers from all brands on the more creative side.
In 1990 it wasn't certain that PC would really take over, everyone was mostly on MS-DOS, and not everyone was still buying into Windows, which only got 3.0 released in the middle of the year and demanded too expensive hardware for most business.
That might be your perception but its far from reality. And the reality is what happens in Spain isn't really all that relevant. Globally speaking anything not PC was a rounding error.
Even if you take all DEC Terminals sold in the 80s, you only get a fraction of the early sales of the PC by the 1990s. Of course timeshare systems had a huge history and install base, and the same for terminals, but by the late 80s PC sales dwarfed it by ridiculous numbers.
Europe generally is more delayed and more fragmented, but the economics of the situation was totally clear and are driven by US home and business demand.
Grey-box PC hardware and PCs in general plummeted in price in the early-mid-90s, making them feasible for consumers where they weren't before.
Doesn't change the fact that on a worldwide basis IBM PC and clones-of sales were through the roof for business customers from about 84 or so on. Not a bubble at all.
There was a period where offices and schools etc would have more heterogenous systems -- especially schools where Apple offered incredibly aggressive educational discounts, and so you'd find a lot of Apple IIs and even the odd Macintosh. But this ended here in Canada at least by about 88, 89. From then on you'd find offices with PCs running DOS -- sometimes Windows -- often running Novel, and using boring business applications like Lotus, WordPerfect or Word, etc.
By the time I was in high school in 90, 91, everything was PC. So much so that I ended up ditching my well-loved Atari ST and getting a 486 myself, because the writing was on the wall and the party was over for 68k machines.
In the Spain in the 80's maybe the a bit-loaded neighbour (or families with older brothers and no duties) had a ZX Spectrum and that's it. IBM PC's were for big companies, corporations, banks and such. They were very expensive, maybe the same cost of a small car. Later, in early 90's, yes, lawyers and small companies got DOS PC's once they became cheap enough.
Macs in Spain were for people from the Humanities branch. Journalists, editors, writers, media creators, graphic designers, audio producers...
> First, IBM didn’t make the most of its dominance. It did little to make the IBM version of the PC truly unique.
Remember IBM had gone through a very painful antitrust case and was still subject to the consent decree. I’m not sure right now of the terms, but it certainly limited the leverages IBM could apply against third parties profiting from the PC.
There was still an antitrust case in process against IBM in 1981 when the PC was launched, it would only be dropped by the US in 1982. I started in 1990 and the fear of another antitrust case pervaded everything through the ten years I was there, even after the earlier consent decree expired.
> I don’t think that culturally IBM ever really felt that the PC was a true IBM product
This makes perfect sense. In the early 2010s I worked with what remained of IBM development and was surprised at the dysfunction, complete lack of manufacturing culture and engineering approaches. I couldn't believe that this culture could produce a successful product. Guess what, it actually didn't.
IBM wasn’t that hopeless, at least not so early. It produced some fairly successful and well-regarded products in the ‘80s and ‘90s like the POWER architecture, the AS/400, and updates to its mainframe line.
I’m sure the IBM of the 2010s bore little resemblance to the engineering culture that gave them the reputation that made the 5150 as important as it was.
2010's would have been too late to see those things. Wrt PCs, the PC company sale was complete and IIRC Lenovo was no longer even sharing space with IBM.
>I don’t think that culturally IBM ever really felt that the PC was a true IBM product.
That was true everywhere. I worked at a mini company at the time when the PC came out. People in that company looked at the PC as a cool thing, but not a real computer.
In 10 or so years, the PC killed of almost all mini computer companies. Some even speculated that was the main reason for IBM to create the PC :)
"IBM had no moat around the PC." is true about the original PC and XT, but they did have 7 patents on the AT. After the PS/2 attempt didn't work out, their lawyers spent the first half of the 1990s going after the chipset makers and the second half of the 1990s getting clone makers themselves to license these patents (along with some other unrelated ones that weren't about to expire).
A quick search showed it isn't easy to find online version of these patents (because IBM has so many that even knowing these are from 1984 didn't help), but I remember that one was related to being able to split a screen into a graphics and a text part in their EGA board (though the Apple II previously did this too, but with a fixed split), one was about detecting 360KB vs 1.2MB floppy drives by seeking to track 60 and then stepping back 59 tracks and checking if we were now at track 0 (not unlike how the Apple II handled the lack of a track 0 signal, but for a different purpose), one was for the "bus master" signal in the PC AT (later ISA) bus and I can't seem to remember the other four but they were all similar in style.
So in the late 1990s you had to pay IBM if you wanted to make a PC clone (AT and up, but 8088 clones had died out in the early 1990s).
IBM tried to make a more thoroughly "IBM" proprietary PC product first with the PCjr and then especially with the PS/2. Attempted to lock down the hardware a bit more, introduced the Microchannel bus/architecture, etc.
But it was too late, and they didn't have the power they thought they had.
They nerfed the PCjr with a horrid keyboard to keep the office people from buying it. This is a shame, as it had better color graphics, and we had to wait for XGA (or Tandy 1000) to get better color.
Margins on consumer PC hardware are quite low, and were really low through the late 90s. There was no point being in that market for them, and they made a pivot to switch to only two markets: services (IBM Global Services is huge still) and mainframe customers (which I gather they must still make a lot of money on, and the hardware is actually quite interesting and well-engineered, just stupid expensive).
I'm surprised Db2 still exists as a product they actively develop, to be honest. Maybe because their services branch and mainframe customers still use it heavily.
This reads like a case study from "The Innovator's Dilemma" by Clayton Christensen.
TL;DR: big incumbents (e.g. IBM) get out-innovated and replaced by scrappy startups even when the incumbent sees it coming and tries to react. The incumbent's business processes, sales metrics (NPII in this story), internal culture and established customer base make it impossible for an innovative product to succeed within the company.
The incumbent produces an innovative gadget. It may even be good, but its Sales Dept earn their quarterly bonus from the existing product line sold to the existing customers. They haven't got time to go chasing small orders of the new gadget from new customers who they don't have a relationship with, and the existing customers don't see the point of the new gadget. So orders for the gadget stagnate.
Across town is the small scrappy start-up making a similar gadget. It lives on those small orders and has a highly motivated sales person who chases those orders full time. So their orders grow, their product improves from the market feedback, and one day the new gadget is actually better than the incumbent's main product. At that point the incumbent goes out of business.
It actually is a case study from the Innovator's Dilemma:
Yet IBM’s success in the first five years of the personal computing industry stands in stark contrast to
the failure of the other leading mainframe and minicomputer makers to catch the disruptive desktop
computing wave. How did IBM do it? It created an autonomous organization in Florida, far away from its
New York state headquarters, that was free to procure components from any source, to sell through its own
channels, and to forge a cost structure appropriate to the technological and competitive requirements
of the personal computing market. The organization was free to succeed along metrics of success that were
relevant to the personal computing market. In fact, some have argued that IBM’s subsequent decision to
link its personal computer division much more closely to its mainstream organization was an important
factor in IBM’s difficulties in maintaining its profitability and market share in the personal computer
industry. It seems to be very difficult to manage the peaceful, unambiguous coexistence of two cost
structures, and two models for how to make money, within a single company.
IBM didn't create an innovative product though. If you look at the era, there were dozens of machines of a similar style on the market, either z80 or 8080, 8088, even 8086... but they ran CP/M. PC-DOS was effectively a kind of fork / rip-off of DR's CP/M, but clean room and customized for 8086.
IBM created a rather generic machine using off the shelf components, and someone else's operating system.
Innovation factor was almost zero.
The only advantage it had was it had IBM's name on it, and IBM was still a Really Big Deal then. It brought "respectability" to a thing that before was still a weird subculture.
I don’t know, I think the concept of a BIOS with a documented API and the included minimal component set (e.g. serial port, parallel port) raised the bar on what third party software could assume existed and could be accessed over the existing 8-bit computers if the time.
> The incumbent produces an innovative gadget. It may even be good, but its Sales Dept earn their quarterly bonus from the existing product line sold to the existing customers.
In a rare feat, Apple managed to do just that with the iPhone, which ate the iPod’s lunch. This at a time when the iPod was a core product, directly responsible for their revival and success, that could have been milked for years to come.
One of Apple’s founding philosophies from Steve Jobs made this explicit:
“One of Job's business rules was to never be afraid of cannibalizing yourself. " If you don't cannibalize yourself, someone else will," he said. So even though an Iphone might cannibalize sales of an IPod, or an IPad might cannibalize sales of a laptop, that did not deter him.” — Walter Isaacson
iPads already outsell Macs. I imagine Apple is willing to accept lower margin overall for iPad hardware (vs. Mac) since it gets a cut of iPad software sales on the App Store. This is perhaps a business reason for why you want macOS on an iPad and Apple does not.
However, Jobs also believed in product differentiation and thought that having too many products in the same space was confusing. Arguably by making iPadOS more macOS-like Apple is reducing that differentiation and increasing confusion.
They also kind of did it with the Mac. For 4 years after the Mac was introduced, it was still the Apple II that was paying the bills, the Mac was flopping. It took stubborn management to keep investing in the Mac and not give up on it and try to evolve the Apple II instead (imagining a future based on the IIgs here)
Ehh, im not sure they could have milked it for very long, if the iphone didn't come out somebody else would have made the same kind of device within a year or two and made ipods obsolete shortly after. PDAs were already a thing with many models and competitors, cell phone transceivers were getting far smaller and efficient, and solid state storage was getting reasonably cheap.
The most impressive thing about the iphone I didn't think has anything to do with the technology, and everything to do with timing the release of a mobile device to hit the sweet spot between the cost of the hardware and capability of the hardware.
I think you greatly underestimate the iPhone’s original impact and the reason that other very successful companies went out of business entirely due to it. It broke new ground in more than just technology e.g. also in the relationship between the phone manufacturer and the carrier, and advantage it kept for some time and in the software developed for it e.g. a full browser versus WAP.
Where I lived in Europe, by the time the iPhone came out, a lot of people (me included) were already using Sony Ericsson Walkman phones instead for music listening
> First, IBM didn’t make the most of its dominance. It did little to make the IBM version of the PC truly unique.
They tried, in the form of the previously mentioned PS/2. They just squeezed a little too hard. There was also the PCjr, which was riddled with enough technical flaws at a blistering price point for it to also end up a flop (Charlie Chaplin was also not exactly a great choice to sell to a market already trending younger). IBM might have eventually gotten it right, they just lost the will to keep trying. Their business model depended on landing corporate whales buying high-margin products and services; mere commodities were a plebeian concern beneath them.
Steve Jobs came to my university in 1984 to push the Mac, where he told us that we students could buy one for half price. At the same talk he rattled off all the flaws of the PCjr and said the famous line "IBM should do us a favor and just throw them all in the Hudson."
VT did deals early(ish) in the home computer era to provide incoming CS students with discounted computers and the first deal was with Apple for Lisas with hard drives, and the next years deal was with IBM for PCjrs. Fortunately I arrived just before that.
A discounted Lisa still cost in the neighborhood of a new car at the time, and given the failure rates of its weird "Twiggy" drive, probably in the shop about as often.
I bought a Lisa in those days for $5000 which was half price, including a 5MB (!) hard disk. It used the same floppies the Mac did. Apple had already removed the twiggies by that time.
I completely understand that if you were there in the culture how this can hopeless outdated. So, I completely understand how this would be a massive flop today. However, at the time, it was extremely well regarded as effective and universally praised. It was just "grind it out" marketing, and maybe you would need to understand Ries and Trout to get it. But is was good by any measurement that was being run. However, it feels like a polyester jumpsuit.
I would argue things like the 1984 ad from Apple were bizarre, and while it makes the mark, it wasn't pivotable in terms of actually being effective. It appealed to Apples core, but wasn't effective in terms of ad dollars.
What was mind blowing is when Jobs came back to Apple, and Chiat/Day launched "Think Different." This was not grind it out. It was not "weird Apple" stuff.
It was awe-inspiring branding that changed the nature of technology marketing. It was beautify and emotive. I think it holds up well today, and may well hold together for many generations to come.
The subsequent "Get a Mac / PC vs Mac" ads were beyond brilliant in being able to pivot away from just emotion to an informed sense of humor.
I like the iPod ads, but we started to lose the edge.
I see none of the raw brilliance today that was a part of the previous years. However, I think they still do a great job of grind it out marketing, and they have continued to understand their brand. Maybe this is okay for where they are at.
In the end neither Think Different or PC vs Mac had much of an effect on getting them any decent market share really. Those were the years when they were barely holding on.
Yes the iMac had big success, but mainly because it was an attractive piece of furniture.
iPad and then especially iPhone is what changed the formula completely. And with it they switched from focusing on a kind of "Think Different" model where they emphasized their oddity and uniqueness to being a luxury lifestyle brand instead.
They even dropped their historical "user friendly" mottos ("It Just Works" and "Computer for the rest of us") because those definitely didn't sound like slogans that high end luxury (or luxury wannabe) consumers would be attracted to.
I don't think you probably have the history to frame this correctly.
Apple was dying. Somehow Steve got his foot in the door at the beginning of '97, and kicked out Gil in around 7 months. It was insane. Steve then immediately launched the Think Different, and personally narrated the ads. He then kills around 70% of the SKUs, killed the Newton, and got out the iMac in '98.
The reason why it was brilliant is because Steve said that we "lost our core." If there was a criticism about the think different campaign is that Steve was retreating to "the core groupees" therefore indicating that Apple was about the niche and not the mainstream. To Steve this was idiotic observation. You build from the devoted first. The campaign was brilliant as it wasn't about market growth, it was about stemming the blood loss and reclaiming the core. Then the MSFT deal was booed when announced. But it was classic Steve at his best.
To call the iMac "a piece of furniture" and the reason for its success is not to understanding how to deliver products and how to drive sales. Steve had an incredible aesthetic sense, and understood that he needs to segment his market an move away from the beige box. If you were in the market, you admired and were shocked at what he did.
But do you understand why suddenly there was an "i" in front? This wasn't about a piece of furniture, it was about portraying a device as your access to the outside world.
Then somehow you believe that the iPad and iPhone changed the formula, but I don't think you understand the iMac was the original example of how to apply the formula of being a product company that delivers a brand promise.
While Steve started as a PC person with Woz, he came back as a product person that had lived the glorious life of NeXT and Pixar. I think his banishment was helpful not hurtful. He understood that iMac was a product and not a PC.
He started asking "what products and what markets will Apple play in." The change was not iPhone or iPad. If you want to ask "when did the formula get copied outside of iMac?"
It was the iPod. It was iTunes. It was owning your own music. However, it was seen as a natural product extension from the iMac. Local storage of music was key.
Once they had a culture of products, then were able to build toward iPhone (iPad is a simple extension and has a much smaller impact on revenue.) However, it wasn't a pivot. It was a build.
While I don't want to dismiss your living through something, nor your wife's work history, by 2002, a lot of this had transitioned.
I have a weird career where I was inside the door of Apple supplying tech in the early 90s, then worked in the PC industry, then returned to spend time inside of Apple as a supplier. I never had personal interactions with Steve, but the people I would interact with would say things like "Steve made the decision."
In this time, I had responsibility for both marketing communications and engineering. (I know weird.) In my Marcom role, we looked at market data on advertising, and worked with figures like Larry Light--who is well known specifically for branding, and we asked him to help us in branding for the PC industry.
I am not going to say that all my observations are right, but I will tell you that this is a field that I specifically worked in, and I have time inside the walls of One Infinite Loop.
I'm not sure it was a misfire — I remember those ads as being pretty popular and having big mindshare. But that was certainly just my small perspective of the times.
I remember eyebrows being raised even at the time over the Chaplin ads, but I suppose they're memorable enough even today that they couldn't have been all that off the mark. Certainly wasn't the worst of the missteps around the PCjr (and I'd forgotten they ran the same flavor of ads for the PC AT, which was a fine machine!)
Externally, it was universally praised. I was selling PC gray market at the time, and it was highly effective. The only people that I knew that had a problem with it was certain IBMers that felt it didn't rep the Blue Channel (corporate sales) and our corporate PCs. However, as the IBM sales took off, I met anybody inside of IBM when I eventually got there that said, "Well that stupid campaign we had...."
Can anyone remember when IBM made their own clones?
Ambra?
They had very unusual mice but I never saw one in the wild.
The sale to Lenovo went very well, when compared to how most mergers, acquisitions and consolidations went in the period. I can't remember Lenovo from before the acquisition and, again, I can't remember seeing any pre-Thinkpad Lenovo machines.
1. Get out from the blue tax
2. Have and alternative procurement path
3. Set up a channel where we might not cannibalize ourselves.
4. Free outselves from some of our rigorous engineering processes
It was basically a fail fast experiment, which is popular today. It was set up with the thought process that we wanted it more virtual and not to disrupt the core business. It became obvious pretty quick that it brought its own set of risks, and so we moved into Aptiva. It is good to try and fail and get out.
Actually, the Lenovo acquisition was a bit of a war. There was some visionary leadership from the most senior level of Lenovo that saw the core USA as extremely valuable, and allowed them to win arguments. While their long term goal was to move the core to China, they were careful to make sure they kept a lot of the USA team engaged, and many key USA individuals did move or travel constantly to China.
However, I wasn't a part of the company when it was sold, so most of this is top level feedback from my friends that did go.
Thanks for chiming in. I vaguely remember the press trolling IBM for Aptiva too.
Where were the Ambra machines sourced? Were they special clones like Compaq (where the BIOS was different), decent commodity clones like Dell or were they generic clones like everything off-brand?
I never understood what the value proposition was. Was it a bit like a supermarket own brand where the customer kind-of guesses that the brand leader makes them, much like how Americans know CostCo Kirkland diapers are made by Huggies?
The value prop is that we could launch a Dell (Gateway) channel by offering leading edge systems, and look for unique features, and live in the other guys holes. The team wasn't stupid, and they had a matrix of where they felt that they could put some products into the ecosystem that could occupy some space that Dell (Gateway) didn't have clear products. If I remember correctly, there was also some thought that we could cut off Dell in EMEA. (Europe.) Dell was far stronger in the USA at the time.
Being this is 30 years ago, I can't remember an exact matrix on some that wasn't my core product. But they had a strategy.
This was early in my career, but I happened to be in a pivotable position that got me access above my pay grade. (I have this weird background in both marketing and engineering, and as somebody that can speak both, I turned into basically a language translator in many meetings, then I was sent out as PR person to the magazines.) I did not work for the Ambra team, but they had an impact on my work, so I got to be involved a enough to see the edges.
I'm not going to have the exact numbers, but I remember that we stated that we were going to have no more than 8 IBMers involved with the thing. The Taiwanese clone market was just starting to take off, and we were starting to outsource to Taiwan. If I remember correctly, it was the Phoenix BIOS, who we had already done a deal with for our Consumer PC line. (Actually, it was co-development.)
As I already wrote, the final bit is that the guys had done some anonymous bid work, and had gotten some very aggressive bids--better than what we were getting. So, they had the impression that they could take a lot of cost out of the system. Also, we wanted to take out Dell and Gateway, but not impact the core IBM brand. Compaq was considered the real comp. HP second. Dell was this annoying "can't stop them because they always win the bids" company. Gateway was on the fringe, and more of a threat to our consumer brand, which was small at the time. But it was free TAM.
So, there was an impression if we followed the Dell/Gateway model, leading tech, very competitive pricing, and full page ads, with some systems that lived in the space, we could start to cannibalize the their TAM.
Now, you don't want to read back into history. The Dell then is not the Dell of now. But, buying behavior was stronger with Dell than the group anticipated. It just was tough to get the velocity growth they wanted. I think we launched in EMEA first, maybe because that is where the VP that ran the thing was from, and then it was rolled out in the USA. However, it just did not see the growth, and I remember there were some quality issues that the small group couldn't handle, but this is pretty foggy.
I will also state that the Round Rock team (and even Gateway), was incredibly tough competition in this arena. I would say that the team did not appreciate this.
However, it was never a massive corporate push for RTP--the home of the PC and PC Server. It was a "let's try this and see if we can learn something." I do remember most of us in the core PC team to NOT get involved as it wasn't pitched as being our core business. If I remember correctly, we did help share some information on parts that we procured to help them.
Its not Costco as the models are so different. As I have run a distribution business before, and Costco is really a marvel to me. My disti business was to the VAR channel, but my sister group used Costco and Walmart. Costco is absolute maniac about delivering value to their customers with quality. Really, it blows me away. They had a bunch of brands, and Sinegal said they could combine them all under Kirkland, turn it into a quality brand to drag up the entire Costco brand. He is so freaking brilliant, and I would argue unique to a company that had a distribution business that wanted to position themselves in the consumer's mind. I would argue that Costco never used their branding to indicate a "secret way" to get a better brand. I think that Costco is keen on making sure that Kirkland IS the brand, which is different than Ambra.
Thanks for asking. I don't think we ever did this type of post mortem at the time, and thinking through events always seems to generate learning for myself as I type it down.
At the time, customers had no idea that this was why these tech companies were operating out of Ireland. All they knew was that you got a lot for your money, and, more importantly, the latest tech. However, you might have to wait 28 days for delivery. It was important to the business model that Dell had not one single employee in the UK or other EU countries apart from Ireland, so it was call centre for everything before the web came along.
There may have been more to the Dell business model of customisation. In the UK, if you order a bespoke product, then you don't have the normal rights to just return it if you don't like it, you are stuck with it, and at the mercy of customer service.
I don't know if Dell played this card because they always had that refurbished gig going, where you could get good kit with a few dents and scratches. Nonetheless, there was very little manufacturing going on, it was just a screwdriver operation, final assembly of what amounted to knock-down kits. You did get the latest and greatest though,
Regardless, compare with the original IBM model where they made PCs in Greenock, Scotland. Undoubtedly you know more about this than I do. However, as I understand it, the original Scottish factory made typewriters before the PC came along, and IBM were incentivised to choose Scotland in the post war years, when the British government were quite serious about bringing industry to Scotland. Shipbuilding had gone on the Clyde, and with it steel and the outfitting and everything else that goes with shipbuilding. There was also an emotional reason for Greenock, Watson had Scottish ancestry.
The product that came out of Greenock was really good. To this day people want those keyboards that came out of there. The Trinitron monitors came from Sony's plant in Bridgend Wales, which they originally opened in the 1970s to make TVs, again with the usual government incentives. Sony also supplied Dell and Gateway 2000. Now all that has gone, RIP Trinitron, we loved you...
I am sure there was more to the supply chain, since, in period, semiconductors were made in Silicon Glen. However, these tended to be things like DRAM chips, where vast fortunes would be spent building a fab for it to be pretty much stillborn.
I am curious as to how 'vertically integrated' the IBM operation was, since hard disks were also made by IBM in Scotland. The IBM PC story is told as 'using commodity off the shelf parts', but IBM PCs were not a product of a screwdriver operation.
It is shocking that the UK have done so badly at tech. However, how was IBM supposed to compete against those tax fiddlers operating out of Dublin? Why did the EU allow Ireland in the UK when they were not taxing the big corporations? The Irish shot themselves in the foot with this as they ended up with house price inflation and very high personal taxation.
The UK also had a lot of tech in the M4 corridor, this being the motorway out of London that goes all the way to (drumroll...) Bridgend. Reading was the prime spot with Compaq, SGI, Microsoft, Oracle, Sybase and plenty of others setting up shop there.
In Reading there was an industrial estate that housed most of them, with their own private motorway. If you were on the train going past you imagined this as being a full on mini-Silicon-Valley, however, not a lot was going on in those impressive headquarter buildings. I am sure Sybase was just a couple of guys hassling the few customers they had for whatever license fees they could get from them, as for Microsoft, there was nobody writing code there, you just had product managers for things such as Microsoft Golf. Same with SGI, just a very big building with nobody in there. It all looked impressive from the train, however, it was just a Potemkin Village.
I am in genuine disbelief regarding how the UK messed up with tech given the advantages of a reasonably educated population, a reasonably high standard of English, access to the EU market, access to the former colonies, an army of 8-bit coders (from the BBC Micro project) and access to capital (London).
I've done both marketing and engineering. I managed a group at RTP responsible for a part of the engineering for PC, Thinkpads, and the Server group. While I had people go to Greenock, I never went personally. So, in some sense, I don't feel like I can give an adequate impression and background.
I will tell you that our team out of Greenock had a big impact on manufacturing, and some real live wires. I remember being at home on the weekend, and have a VP of manufacturing hunt me down to say words that normally IBMer wouldn't say in that I was bringing down his line. It really was the stereotypical Scottish Soccer fan type interaction. In this case, it turned out that it wasn't my group. After I left IBM, I ended up supplying tech to all my IBM competitors. I observed what I thought was basically all of IBM processes in their processes. Similar terminology that I know started at IBM. While we did see some people move, a big part of this was the supplier base.
We did do a lot of work with outside resources. For example, we "qualified" power supplies, but we basically did co-engineering. Part of our problem in that we would significantly change everybody's product, then they would sell it to Dell or Gateway. This was a very quick path to get your processes into the comp as the suppliers would "suggest" things that they had learned at IBM.
The hard drive issue is a bit more subtle. IBM was not the original supplier to our own PCs--and they had a melt down with a massive recall. I don't remember us making hard drives in Scotland. I remember Mainz, Rochester MN, San Jose, and Fujisawa. The PC client group took almost exclusively Fujisawa products. The server group worked to take San Jose/Rochester server products. Rochester was the 5.25 and then 3.5" lines for AS/400, so they were at first leading with the PC server group. I will relate that I think HDDs were always the #1 reason for Quality No Ship (QNS), mainly due to shock specs, which got better over time.
As to the delivery of tech in the UK. I would state that it is similar inside of the USA. Try as many want, tech seems to be focused in the New York, Bay Area and in Puget Sound. While I was in RPT, and this state killed themselves to get tech (including 3 incredible Universities right next door), for some reason it never turned into a tech hub. Without research, I would state that there is also an element of chance or luck that gets a region going, and can't be planned for. However, maybe your just pointing out that UK never even gave themselves any chance, which I am just not close enough to understand.
It's always interesting to see these types of articles with a bunch of people pontificating about what was or wasn't happening at IBM. I started my career at IBM and had the chance to engage with the Boca Raton group and the PC division there, working as an internal supplier within IBM. The idea that the PC Group was somehow destroyed by "antibodies" is ridiculous on its face—this notion is often spoken by people who have no real background with the group or a true understanding of what was going on.
As Patrick Lencioni has often said, we have things reported as strategy, when it turns out to be people issues. A lot of what happened at IBM only makes sense if you were there.
I'll list some things here, though since I'm late to the conversation, I’m not sure how much it will be observed. However, perhaps an IBMer who was with the PC Company will come across this and add a few more alternatives or supporting facts.
1. IBM was a wildly diverse place culturally. We had almost half a million employees worldwide. As with any large corporation, you could find divergent views—anyone could find a person or two to support anything they wanted to claim about the company. However, the PC division was generally well regarded. Sure, you can find somebody who said something about "antibodies", but you can find a lot more who would say that’s ridiculous. I tend more toward the latter than the former.
2. Don Estridge was a bit of a cowboy. He did love being down in Florida, which gave him the ability to move quickly. Still, I would say IBM allowed for its “wild ducks”, and while the PC group was one of the more obvious successes, it was not IBM’s only success. Estridge died in a well-publicized airplane accident at Dallas Fort Worth. I don't think most people understand how much cultural impact this had on the group. Although it could be debated, I do believe we could say it was as if Bill Gates or Steve Jobs had been taken out of their company. The amazing thing about the PC group is that it didn’t collapse after his death.
3. The single most destructive thing IBM did was thinking they could take the PC group out of Boca and transport it to Research Triangle Park. After it moved to RTP, I got to work there with many of the group’s core members. They consistently described how the move was traumatic to virtually every aspect of a team that was truly world-class. (Another issue: There was also a development decision in Boca that some decried—some forward-thinking was shelved—but I wasn’t heavily involved in that, and it wasn’t so universal.)
4. I was in the midst of the turmoil as IBM reached the midlife of the PC in RTP. By that stage, we had given up on the idea of clear, proprietary closed systems. Yet at the same time, we were doing some excellent engineering and marketing—we were finally winning awards from PC magazines for the desktops, and people already loved our laptops. But we were clearly hamstrung. Without going deep into details, it’s clear in today’s economy that certain business units serve different purposes. The PC Division was expected to make a lot of money while paying what was internally called “the blue tax.” In other words, corporate hit us with effective tax rates and metrics that basically made it impossible to compete with Compaq or Dell. What most people don’t realize is that one of the biggest impacts of selling the group to Lenovo was the removal of the blue tax. Many key U.S. development team members stayed with the company, and though Lenovo was committed to eventually moving true development headquarters to China, it would have collapsed without an incredibly dedicated group of IBMers who were unfailingly unselfish. There was something about the culture—dedication to the team was one of the most important things you could do, even after the group had been sold to Lenovo.
On reflection, if Estridge never died, and if the division had never moved from Boca, the computing industry would be very different as being apart of what happened.
> The PC Division was expected to make a lot of money while paying what was internally called “the blue tax.” In other words, corporate hit us with effective tax rates and metrics that basically made it impossible to compete with Compaq or Dell
Thank you for confirming the precise point that I made in the post!
I don't think this was what the external post was about. The Blue Tax was put on everybody, and was a requirement for a business model. The external post said nobody really wanted to sell the PC and "antibodies" made sure that the the IBM PC company would be rejected.
This is pretty well understood about defining your business model, and is not an antibody issue.
The real threat was Microsoft, which we understood at the time. Our biggest problem is not the OS, it was the apps.
No, because it became a locked down ecosystem that is user-hostile and not user-controllable. I realized this when I observed the younger generation, who I thought would be much better than us at computing, who had not a clue how anything worked because they never had the ability, need, or desire to tinker with the underlying systems, with only rare exceptions (roms, etc).
Depends on your lifestyle and location. The only thing I use my cellphone for is text messaging and looking at wikipedia or part numbers when im not at home. It is definitely useful, but 95% of my computer work is still done on a PC.
A smartphone (-like device) has indeed the potential to be an ultramobile general-purpose personal computer. Sadly, virtually all of them don't reach that potential.
Thank the fate for PC to exist!
Open nature of PC allowed for truly free/open source software to exist which can be functional without big corporate lockdown. I can fully assemble it with parts I can buy individually and as long as they are compatible (which is mentioned on the box, no hidden knowledge here) I can expect it to work within the mentioned warranty.
My PC based computers can be booted and fully functional with Debain, Fedora and (put your favorite Linux, BSD distro here mine is openSUSE Tumbleweed). There is no parallel ecosystem which yet, which rivals PC in terms of open specs and fully tinkerable hardware and software.
Macbooks are locked down with Apple and forget about your own hardware.
Android seemed like a competitor, but closed nature of its development and lack commodity hardware around ARM based phones means that FOSS layer exists only in user bases apps. We have custom ROMs which require bootable blobs from vendors and its non-reliable and breaks often.
It's common for people to assume that if IBM didn't use a simple, open architecture with off-the-shelf components for the original PC, then we'd never have had the PC ecosystem as we know it.
But this view neglects the fact that an organic ecosystem of interoperable open hardware converging to de facto standards and running a common OS already existed prior to IBM designing their PC. By 1980, there were already many independent vendors implementing their own variation on the 8080/S-100 design pioneered by MITS, all running CP/M from Digital Research.
When IBM released the PC, the CP/M world was still going strong. The fact that it was an easily cloneable architecture based on the 16-bit 8086 caused a lot of disruption, and led to the market dynamics that were already present in the 8080-S100-CP/M world pivoting over to x86-ISA-DOS.
If IBM had kept their PC proprietary, it might have led to a bit more fragmentation in the short-term market for business microcomputing, but at the same time, the CP/M world would have continued on without that disruption, and something else would have ultimately catalyzed the move to a common 16-bit architecture. DR was already working on CP/M-86 at the time IBM was developing the PC, after all.
Eventually, the same forces that led to the collapse of vertically integrated, proprietary platforms and the dominance of open-standards system builders would have asserted themselves, and IBM itself would still have been subdued by them. Modern computing would likely be in a similar position with or without IBM. The PC was a major ripple, but didn't really change the current.
You are right. We are lucky. A company like Digital could have made the PDP-11 into 'the PC' and lock it down from the beginning. IBM could have done the same if they had not been so incompetent. In such a case you would have Intel, IBM and Microsoft being a single organization that would have become to powerful.
We still had plenty of issue with Intel and Microsoft being able to play out their monopoly.
So I think it could have been a lot worse, but it could also have been a lot better.
> A company like Digital could have made the PDP-11 into 'the PC'
They did! I kind of want one of these PDP-11 based PCs:
1977: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heathkit_H11
1982: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DEC_Professional
I know of course, I'm love DEC history. But of course DEC Professional wasn't full compatible and cost far to much to be a Personal Computer. They closed down the bus also. It was more designed as Professional work station. And of course the famously released it with Rainbow and Decmade II. DEC had already lost by then.
Heathkit H11 was an opportunity but of course never followed up with.
Yea but we're stuck with the same horrible keybindings that stopped making sense before the 90s hit
> Macbooks are locked down with Apple and forget about your own hardware.
Not completely. Asahi linux boots on bare metal and runs great on Apple silicon machines prior to the M3.
Mostly because Apple is so rich that they don't care. If they were not swimming in a pool of money this wouldn't happen.
> If they were not swimming in a pool of money this wouldn't happen.
Interestingly enough, Apple helped to develop a version of Linux running on the Mach microkernel, and handed out thousands of MkLinux CDs at WWDC and MacWorld Boston in 1996. Macs have been running Linux in various ways ever since.
http://www.mklinux.org
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MkLinux
http://gate.crashing.org/doc/ppc/doc003.htm
Windows has also been running on intel Macs since Boot Camp in 2007. It remains to be seen whether ARM Windows will ever run natively on Apple Silicon however.
In those days Apple was doing whatever they could to avoid bankruptcy.
What do you suppose they would do? Seems to me that once the hardware is out there someone determined enough can find a way, no? I don’t see how this would affect their bottom line negatively either… hell, if they officially supported Linux I’m sure their hardware sales would do even better!
They have unofficially added boot? code that helps Asahi Linux. They not only don’t care, they’ve actively abetted.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29591578
Parent tweet is dead, you know what happened ?
How many people would even want to boot Linux or Windows on a Apple laptop?
At least one: Me. I prefer Linux to MacOS and Apple makes the best laptop hardware.
Just wait for the PC ARM to take off as the anti-x86 keeps cheerleading, how open do you think it will remain?
lol I remember years ago, people complained so much about "Wintel." And while I'm currently in the Linux+AMD camp, Intel and Windows are still far more open than any ARM+Android/iOS/anything world
Microsoft has been a decent enough steward of the x86 PC standard and the qualification test suite that defines it. If they are smart (which isn't necessarily guaranteed) and with enough pressure from industry and anti-competitiveness regulators to not close it off, they would probably be an adequate steward of a ARM PC standard as well.
Microsoft deliberately requested that "secure" boot NOT be allowed to be disabled on ARM devices in their requirements.
Don't believe me?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_boot#Secure_Boot_critic...
"x86-based systems certified for Windows 8 must allow Secure Boot to enter custom mode or be disabled, but not on systems using the ARM architecture"
You forgot to add the security CPU requirements using Pluton, based on XBox security, which I bet many HNers are unaware of.
The market is already full of ARM development boards that are pretty powerful. Just need to scale these up and put some real power on them.
Put something with the power of an M series or a Graviton on these and you have the start of a great ARM PC market.
There's nothing inherently not-open about ARM, or at least it's no less open by nature than x86. The fact that most ARM devices are locked down is a secondary effect from most of them being phones.
RISC-V would be more open than either of these but it still lags on performance. I have a RISC-V board but it's kind of slow. Not terrible but wouldn't make a good PC for anything but basic uses.
> There's nothing inherently not-open about ARM, or at least it's no less open by nature than x86. The fact that most ARM devices are locked down is a secondary effect from most of them being phones.
I'd argue lack of something like ACPI to discover the device tree and memory map is why this impression exists. Besides the ARM CPUs not being socketed.
Exactly. There is no agreement on how the universal operating system should expect the generic ARM computer to boot and expose its hardware.
You’d have the start of a niche hobbyist market that no one would care about. Software is needed before a market exists.
> There's nothing inherently not-open about ARM,
UEFI ?
UEFI doesn't help with hardware discovery. ACPI does. Commonly with non-PC systems the hardware addresses are hard-coded and they need to be known by the OS somehow. Device trees are that and there are nonofficial ways of exposing them as a UEFI driver but it is nowhere as official as ACPI on PC systems.
> Just wait for the PC ARM to take off
I'm waiting. A PC (ATX) with ARM or RISC-V or Mx or Power would be very nice.
Haven't seen any though. Raspberry is a joke from a PC extendability point of view.
Because OEM rather sell laptops with vertical integration, which are going to become the PC of the future, as the build your own desktop market keeps shrinking.
ironically, you should be thanking Apple that the IBM PC exists
The Apple II was an open system and IBM clearly took a lot of inspiration from the Apple II line. Look at the 5150 motherboard in the picture in the article and compare it to the motherboard from an Apple II+
Contrary to the popular belief, Apple is not the second coming of our lord and savior. We can thank Compaq[1] for the open PC ecosystem though.
[1] https://www.allaboutcircuits.com/news/how-compaqs-clone-comp...
Apple II was an open system in a sense. Apple published the schematics and ROM source code. But it didn't have well defined interfaces that developers respected. A lot of published software, including some of the most popular apps, made use of variables and entry points in "unofficial" ways. This made it impossible for Apple or anybody else to even know how it was being used, much less to write a compatible ROM or OS that was not an exact copy of the original.
And if an updated system were to break any published app, Apple would be blamed. There were apps, albeit only a few, that would not run on an Apple IIe, and I think, a few more that wouldn't run on a IIc.
There were some notable violations of published entry points in MS-DOS software, most notably the page locations of display memory, leading to the famous "640k barrier." But they weren't enough to dissuade developers from treating the PC as an "open enough" platform.
I doubt that developers felt a particular sense of morality about the DOS interface, that they didn't feel about Apple II, but only that the interface was good enough to use as-is.
The real important thing here, was the openly published interface, and mutual agreement among devs to respect that interface. I mean "open enough" and "mostly respect" of course.
And when people made Apple II clones, most of them (like the Franklin Ace series) got sued out of existence by Apple. Eventually true clean-room ROMs were created like for the Laser 128, but that was fairly late in the life-span of the Apple II.
I believe they were both "accidentally open" for similar reasons. Neither company produced the most important chips and components in the device itself. That meant that you could assemble a greater understanding of the device than even the manufacturer had and there was good incentive for putting this effort in the early days of computing.
Intentionally open. As noted above, Apple published schematics and ROM source code. IBM published system board schematics as well as the BIOS source code.
> The Apple II was an open system
All computers which could be bought by individuals at that time were 'open systems', they usually came with a full set of hardware schematics and programming documentation, and sometimes even ROM listings. The Apple II was nothing special in that regard.
PC only got where it was thanks to the mistakes that made clones possible.
Everyone else, including other IBM offerings, were all about vertical integration.
It is no coincidence that nowadays with PC desktops being largely left to enthusiastics and gamers, OEMs are all doubling down on vertical integration across laptops and mobile devices, as means to recoup the thin margins that have come to be.
The original IBM PC was proprietary only in its BIOS. It was a mistake IBM regretted very soon and tried to fix with an PS/2 architecture, MCA bus, and even OS/2 operating system.
But Microsoft and the companies that made PC clones did everything to keep this "mistake" alive.
In fact, the openness of the PC platform is a historical accident. Other proprietary personal computer manufacturers (like Apple, Commodore and Atari) also never planned to create an open platform either. The closest thing was the 8-bit MSX platform, which was a Microsoft thing for the Japanese market, and it was very soon outdated.
Other than using COTS parts (incl. the CPU), the BIOS, while proprietary, was in a way the weakest link as far as cloning, since it established a ROM-based standardized hardware interface that isolated the OS from the hardware.
Companies like Compaq, and later Phoenix and AMI, were able to get around the proprietary nature of the BIOS by building clean-room BIOS clones that withstood IBM's legal challenges.
However, given the willingness of Microsoft (apparently with little IBM could do about it) to sell MS-DOS variants to others like Compaq, and later the emergence of MS-DOS clones like DR-DOS, it's not obvious that clones might not still have taken off without the unintentional assist of the standardized BIOS interface.
I wouldn't say the BIOS was the weakest link. It was really the only obstacle, albeit a weak one. Surely, the BIOS was clean-room reverse engineered very soon and after that, the PC-clone market just exploded.
However, if there were no BIOS, the thin hardware abstraction layer that the BIOS provided would be part of MS-DOS. I see only two historical alternatives from that:
1. Microsoft would have had an even greater upper hand in controlling the PC market.
2. IBM could have kept the BIOS proprietary (even though as a part of MS DOS), which prevented Microsoft from selling MS-DOS independently with an IBM PC abstraction layer.
However, even if option 2 prevailed, Microsoft could have created its own BIOS to ensure that software written for MS-DOS would be compatible across the PC clone market.
There’s a lot, lot more to a PC being standard than the BIOS API. Attempts like the Tandy 2000 showed that hardware that deviated too much couldn’t run the same software and failed.
Amazing that Tandy managed to turn success into failure twice in the PC market.
> standardized hardware interface that isolated the OS from the hardware
Exactly the point of having a BIOS. CP/M had one as well.
Of course, but it confers the same advantage to the clone maker that it did to IBM, which is why it might be regarded as a weakness in terms of preventing clones (although I've no idea if that was something that IBM was anticipating).
> mistakes that made clones possible
You mean like publishing the system board schematics and a full source listing for the BIOS?
That seems to have been surprisingly normal for PCs in the late 1970s.
Apple also published schematics and listings, and had to deal with clones, but Apple 2 clones weren't particularly useful without a copy of (or compatible replacement for) Apple's ROM, which Apple did not license.
Protected under copyright law, and not allowed for cloning just because.
I am 70's child, kind of aware how common it used to be during those days.
I think the big change over the past 17 years has been the app stores (and on the less 'personal' computer side businesses will be on support contracts), the from the manufacturers point of view hardware and software is a loss leader to try and funnel users to where they do as much computer related commerce through their middle-man. In some ways it's an evolution of bundling software where that would be another source of income.
That is certainly part of it.
> I think the big change over the past 17 years has been the app stores
And also cloud applications, which are useless without the harder-to-clone data center part.
I do not think that is true. Lets remember that still in 1990 IBM alone was about 50% of the whole market. Even without clones IBM PC would have won.
Had IBM made clones impossible they could likely have captured far more of the market.
It certainly wasn't IBM ability to produce PC that prevented them selling more.
Likely eventually they would have licensed the architecture to AT&T and the like.
Vertical integration could have worked, we are just lucky it didn't.
In what bubble?
In 1990, everyone on my higschool that had access to computers was distributed between Spectrum, Atari ST, Amiga, and PCs, with PCs being the minority.
Personally I only moved into PCs in 1991, with a 386SX.
Until then, I only used the PC1512 ones on the school lab.
I became part of the PC minority.
Feel free to look at the data. Yes, in Europe Amiga and ST had ok sales, specially at home and mostly for games. But they had almost non in the US, the biggest market, and same in Japan.
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/archive/artic...
By 1990 everything other then PC is a rounding error. Before that some 8-bit systems were relevant.
The one outside your bubble. In the business world where sales occurred, IBM had a huge advantage.
In which country, again?
Because in Iberian Penisula, it was full of green phosphor terminals into timesharing systems, and random 16 bit computers from all brands on the more creative side.
In 1990 it wasn't certain that PC would really take over, everyone was mostly on MS-DOS, and not everyone was still buying into Windows, which only got 3.0 released in the middle of the year and demanded too expensive hardware for most business.
That might be your perception but its far from reality. And the reality is what happens in Spain isn't really all that relevant. Globally speaking anything not PC was a rounding error.
Even if you take all DEC Terminals sold in the 80s, you only get a fraction of the early sales of the PC by the 1990s. Of course timeshare systems had a huge history and install base, and the same for terminals, but by the late 80s PC sales dwarfed it by ridiculous numbers.
Europe generally is more delayed and more fragmented, but the economics of the situation was totally clear and are driven by US home and business demand.
Ditto in Spain. Until 1996 or so I didn't see WIndows 95 installs. From 1997 they were everywhere.
Grey-box PC hardware and PCs in general plummeted in price in the early-mid-90s, making them feasible for consumers where they weren't before.
Doesn't change the fact that on a worldwide basis IBM PC and clones-of sales were through the roof for business customers from about 84 or so on. Not a bubble at all.
There was a period where offices and schools etc would have more heterogenous systems -- especially schools where Apple offered incredibly aggressive educational discounts, and so you'd find a lot of Apple IIs and even the odd Macintosh. But this ended here in Canada at least by about 88, 89. From then on you'd find offices with PCs running DOS -- sometimes Windows -- often running Novel, and using boring business applications like Lotus, WordPerfect or Word, etc.
By the time I was in high school in 90, 91, everything was PC. So much so that I ended up ditching my well-loved Atari ST and getting a 486 myself, because the writing was on the wall and the party was over for 68k machines.
In the Spain in the 80's maybe the a bit-loaded neighbour (or families with older brothers and no duties) had a ZX Spectrum and that's it. IBM PC's were for big companies, corporations, banks and such. They were very expensive, maybe the same cost of a small car. Later, in early 90's, yes, lawyers and small companies got DOS PC's once they became cheap enough.
Macs in Spain were for people from the Humanities branch. Journalists, editors, writers, media creators, graphic designers, audio producers...
> First, IBM didn’t make the most of its dominance. It did little to make the IBM version of the PC truly unique.
Remember IBM had gone through a very painful antitrust case and was still subject to the consent decree. I’m not sure right now of the terms, but it certainly limited the leverages IBM could apply against third parties profiting from the PC.
There was still an antitrust case in process against IBM in 1981 when the PC was launched, it would only be dropped by the US in 1982. I started in 1990 and the fear of another antitrust case pervaded everything through the ten years I was there, even after the earlier consent decree expired.
Having lived through all this, I highly recommend "The Crazy Ones" blog from Gareth Edwards. https://every.to/the-crazy-ones
The blog on Don Estridge covers IBM's place in PC history in fascinating and extensive detail.
Mr. Edwards also reminded me what a debt Linux users owe to Rod Canion for making the gang of 9 and open hardware a reality.
> I don’t think that culturally IBM ever really felt that the PC was a true IBM product
This makes perfect sense. In the early 2010s I worked with what remained of IBM development and was surprised at the dysfunction, complete lack of manufacturing culture and engineering approaches. I couldn't believe that this culture could produce a successful product. Guess what, it actually didn't.
IBM wasn’t that hopeless, at least not so early. It produced some fairly successful and well-regarded products in the ‘80s and ‘90s like the POWER architecture, the AS/400, and updates to its mainframe line.
I’m sure the IBM of the 2010s bore little resemblance to the engineering culture that gave them the reputation that made the 5150 as important as it was.
2010's would have been too late to see those things. Wrt PCs, the PC company sale was complete and IIRC Lenovo was no longer even sharing space with IBM.
The PC group was sold to Lenovo in 2005. What group did you work with and where?
>I don’t think that culturally IBM ever really felt that the PC was a true IBM product.
That was true everywhere. I worked at a mini company at the time when the PC came out. People in that company looked at the PC as a cool thing, but not a real computer.
In 10 or so years, the PC killed of almost all mini computer companies. Some even speculated that was the main reason for IBM to create the PC :)
They were also clever being on the first line supporting Linux back in the 2000's.
Nowadays not only they own one of the few UNIX proper left standing, they also own everything Red-Hat contributes for.
"IBM had no moat around the PC." is true about the original PC and XT, but they did have 7 patents on the AT. After the PS/2 attempt didn't work out, their lawyers spent the first half of the 1990s going after the chipset makers and the second half of the 1990s getting clone makers themselves to license these patents (along with some other unrelated ones that weren't about to expire).
A quick search showed it isn't easy to find online version of these patents (because IBM has so many that even knowing these are from 1984 didn't help), but I remember that one was related to being able to split a screen into a graphics and a text part in their EGA board (though the Apple II previously did this too, but with a fixed split), one was about detecting 360KB vs 1.2MB floppy drives by seeking to track 60 and then stepping back 59 tracks and checking if we were now at track 0 (not unlike how the Apple II handled the lack of a track 0 signal, but for a different purpose), one was for the "bus master" signal in the PC AT (later ISA) bus and I can't seem to remember the other four but they were all similar in style.
So in the late 1990s you had to pay IBM if you wanted to make a PC clone (AT and up, but 8088 clones had died out in the early 1990s).
IBM tried to make a more thoroughly "IBM" proprietary PC product first with the PCjr and then especially with the PS/2. Attempted to lock down the hardware a bit more, introduced the Microchannel bus/architecture, etc.
But it was too late, and they didn't have the power they thought they had.
They nerfed the PCjr with a horrid keyboard to keep the office people from buying it. This is a shame, as it had better color graphics, and we had to wait for XGA (or Tandy 1000) to get better color.
I find it sad that IBM didn’t view ThinkPad as a core business and chose to sell it instead. They made some of the best laptops at the time.
Margins on consumer PC hardware are quite low, and were really low through the late 90s. There was no point being in that market for them, and they made a pivot to switch to only two markets: services (IBM Global Services is huge still) and mainframe customers (which I gather they must still make a lot of money on, and the hardware is actually quite interesting and well-engineered, just stupid expensive).
I'm surprised Db2 still exists as a product they actively develop, to be honest. Maybe because their services branch and mainframe customers still use it heavily.
This reads like a case study from "The Innovator's Dilemma" by Clayton Christensen.
TL;DR: big incumbents (e.g. IBM) get out-innovated and replaced by scrappy startups even when the incumbent sees it coming and tries to react. The incumbent's business processes, sales metrics (NPII in this story), internal culture and established customer base make it impossible for an innovative product to succeed within the company.
The incumbent produces an innovative gadget. It may even be good, but its Sales Dept earn their quarterly bonus from the existing product line sold to the existing customers. They haven't got time to go chasing small orders of the new gadget from new customers who they don't have a relationship with, and the existing customers don't see the point of the new gadget. So orders for the gadget stagnate.
Across town is the small scrappy start-up making a similar gadget. It lives on those small orders and has a highly motivated sales person who chases those orders full time. So their orders grow, their product improves from the market feedback, and one day the new gadget is actually better than the incumbent's main product. At that point the incumbent goes out of business.
It actually is a case study from the Innovator's Dilemma:
IBM didn't create an innovative product though. If you look at the era, there were dozens of machines of a similar style on the market, either z80 or 8080, 8088, even 8086... but they ran CP/M. PC-DOS was effectively a kind of fork / rip-off of DR's CP/M, but clean room and customized for 8086.
IBM created a rather generic machine using off the shelf components, and someone else's operating system.
Innovation factor was almost zero.
The only advantage it had was it had IBM's name on it, and IBM was still a Really Big Deal then. It brought "respectability" to a thing that before was still a weird subculture.
I don’t know, I think the concept of a BIOS with a documented API and the included minimal component set (e.g. serial port, parallel port) raised the bar on what third party software could assume existed and could be accessed over the existing 8-bit computers if the time.
The IBM PC did not include a serial or parallel port. Just a keyboard port and a cassette port (the latter of which approximately nobody used)
CP/M had a BIOS with a documented API.
> The incumbent produces an innovative gadget. It may even be good, but its Sales Dept earn their quarterly bonus from the existing product line sold to the existing customers.
In a rare feat, Apple managed to do just that with the iPhone, which ate the iPod’s lunch. This at a time when the iPod was a core product, directly responsible for their revival and success, that could have been milked for years to come.
One of Apple’s founding philosophies from Steve Jobs made this explicit:
“One of Job's business rules was to never be afraid of cannibalizing yourself. " If you don't cannibalize yourself, someone else will," he said. So even though an Iphone might cannibalize sales of an IPod, or an IPad might cannibalize sales of a laptop, that did not deter him.” — Walter Isaacson
and now we have ipad that perfectly capable of running MacOs but Apple refuse to do so.
iPads already outsell Macs. I imagine Apple is willing to accept lower margin overall for iPad hardware (vs. Mac) since it gets a cut of iPad software sales on the App Store. This is perhaps a business reason for why you want macOS on an iPad and Apple does not.
However, Jobs also believed in product differentiation and thought that having too many products in the same space was confusing. Arguably by making iPadOS more macOS-like Apple is reducing that differentiation and increasing confusion.
They also kind of did it with the Mac. For 4 years after the Mac was introduced, it was still the Apple II that was paying the bills, the Mac was flopping. It took stubborn management to keep investing in the Mac and not give up on it and try to evolve the Apple II instead (imagining a future based on the IIgs here)
Ehh, im not sure they could have milked it for very long, if the iphone didn't come out somebody else would have made the same kind of device within a year or two and made ipods obsolete shortly after. PDAs were already a thing with many models and competitors, cell phone transceivers were getting far smaller and efficient, and solid state storage was getting reasonably cheap.
The most impressive thing about the iphone I didn't think has anything to do with the technology, and everything to do with timing the release of a mobile device to hit the sweet spot between the cost of the hardware and capability of the hardware.
I think you greatly underestimate the iPhone’s original impact and the reason that other very successful companies went out of business entirely due to it. It broke new ground in more than just technology e.g. also in the relationship between the phone manufacturer and the carrier, and advantage it kept for some time and in the software developed for it e.g. a full browser versus WAP.
Where I lived in Europe, by the time the iPhone came out, a lot of people (me included) were already using Sony Ericsson Walkman phones instead for music listening
> First, IBM didn’t make the most of its dominance. It did little to make the IBM version of the PC truly unique.
They tried, in the form of the previously mentioned PS/2. They just squeezed a little too hard. There was also the PCjr, which was riddled with enough technical flaws at a blistering price point for it to also end up a flop (Charlie Chaplin was also not exactly a great choice to sell to a market already trending younger). IBM might have eventually gotten it right, they just lost the will to keep trying. Their business model depended on landing corporate whales buying high-margin products and services; mere commodities were a plebeian concern beneath them.
Steve Jobs came to my university in 1984 to push the Mac, where he told us that we students could buy one for half price. At the same talk he rattled off all the flaws of the PCjr and said the famous line "IBM should do us a favor and just throw them all in the Hudson."
VT did deals early(ish) in the home computer era to provide incoming CS students with discounted computers and the first deal was with Apple for Lisas with hard drives, and the next years deal was with IBM for PCjrs. Fortunately I arrived just before that.
A discounted Lisa still cost in the neighborhood of a new car at the time, and given the failure rates of its weird "Twiggy" drive, probably in the shop about as often.
I bought a Lisa in those days for $5000 which was half price, including a 5MB (!) hard disk. It used the same floppies the Mac did. Apple had already removed the twiggies by that time.
I'm glad we have a word now for Charlie Chaplin misfire: Cringe
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1LR1Xvvch18
I completely understand that if you were there in the culture how this can hopeless outdated. So, I completely understand how this would be a massive flop today. However, at the time, it was extremely well regarded as effective and universally praised. It was just "grind it out" marketing, and maybe you would need to understand Ries and Trout to get it. But is was good by any measurement that was being run. However, it feels like a polyester jumpsuit.
I would argue things like the 1984 ad from Apple were bizarre, and while it makes the mark, it wasn't pivotable in terms of actually being effective. It appealed to Apples core, but wasn't effective in terms of ad dollars.
What was mind blowing is when Jobs came back to Apple, and Chiat/Day launched "Think Different." This was not grind it out. It was not "weird Apple" stuff.
It was awe-inspiring branding that changed the nature of technology marketing. It was beautify and emotive. I think it holds up well today, and may well hold together for many generations to come.
The subsequent "Get a Mac / PC vs Mac" ads were beyond brilliant in being able to pivot away from just emotion to an informed sense of humor.
I like the iPod ads, but we started to lose the edge.
I see none of the raw brilliance today that was a part of the previous years. However, I think they still do a great job of grind it out marketing, and they have continued to understand their brand. Maybe this is okay for where they are at.
In the end neither Think Different or PC vs Mac had much of an effect on getting them any decent market share really. Those were the years when they were barely holding on.
Yes the iMac had big success, but mainly because it was an attractive piece of furniture.
iPad and then especially iPhone is what changed the formula completely. And with it they switched from focusing on a kind of "Think Different" model where they emphasized their oddity and uniqueness to being a luxury lifestyle brand instead.
They even dropped their historical "user friendly" mottos ("It Just Works" and "Computer for the rest of us") because those definitely didn't sound like slogans that high end luxury (or luxury wannabe) consumers would be attracted to.
I don't think you probably have the history to frame this correctly.
Apple was dying. Somehow Steve got his foot in the door at the beginning of '97, and kicked out Gil in around 7 months. It was insane. Steve then immediately launched the Think Different, and personally narrated the ads. He then kills around 70% of the SKUs, killed the Newton, and got out the iMac in '98.
The reason why it was brilliant is because Steve said that we "lost our core." If there was a criticism about the think different campaign is that Steve was retreating to "the core groupees" therefore indicating that Apple was about the niche and not the mainstream. To Steve this was idiotic observation. You build from the devoted first. The campaign was brilliant as it wasn't about market growth, it was about stemming the blood loss and reclaiming the core. Then the MSFT deal was booed when announced. But it was classic Steve at his best.
To call the iMac "a piece of furniture" and the reason for its success is not to understanding how to deliver products and how to drive sales. Steve had an incredible aesthetic sense, and understood that he needs to segment his market an move away from the beige box. If you were in the market, you admired and were shocked at what he did.
But do you understand why suddenly there was an "i" in front? This wasn't about a piece of furniture, it was about portraying a device as your access to the outside world.
Then somehow you believe that the iPad and iPhone changed the formula, but I don't think you understand the iMac was the original example of how to apply the formula of being a product company that delivers a brand promise.
While Steve started as a PC person with Woz, he came back as a product person that had lived the glorious life of NeXT and Pixar. I think his banishment was helpful not hurtful. He understood that iMac was a product and not a PC.
He started asking "what products and what markets will Apple play in." The change was not iPhone or iPad. If you want to ask "when did the formula get copied outside of iMac?"
It was the iPod. It was iTunes. It was owning your own music. However, it was seen as a natural product extension from the iMac. Local storage of music was key.
Once they had a culture of products, then were able to build toward iPhone (iPad is a simple extension and has a much smaller impact on revenue.) However, it wasn't a pivot. It was a build.
> I don't think you probably have the history to frame this correctly.
I was born in '74, lived through the whole period, and my wife worked in marketing at Apple 2002-2010
While I don't want to dismiss your living through something, nor your wife's work history, by 2002, a lot of this had transitioned.
I have a weird career where I was inside the door of Apple supplying tech in the early 90s, then worked in the PC industry, then returned to spend time inside of Apple as a supplier. I never had personal interactions with Steve, but the people I would interact with would say things like "Steve made the decision."
In this time, I had responsibility for both marketing communications and engineering. (I know weird.) In my Marcom role, we looked at market data on advertising, and worked with figures like Larry Light--who is well known specifically for branding, and we asked him to help us in branding for the PC industry.
I am not going to say that all my observations are right, but I will tell you that this is a field that I specifically worked in, and I have time inside the walls of One Infinite Loop.
I'm not sure it was a misfire — I remember those ads as being pretty popular and having big mindshare. But that was certainly just my small perspective of the times.
I remember eyebrows being raised even at the time over the Chaplin ads, but I suppose they're memorable enough even today that they couldn't have been all that off the mark. Certainly wasn't the worst of the missteps around the PCjr (and I'd forgotten they ran the same flavor of ads for the PC AT, which was a fine machine!)
Externally, it was universally praised. I was selling PC gray market at the time, and it was highly effective. The only people that I knew that had a problem with it was certain IBMers that felt it didn't rep the Blue Channel (corporate sales) and our corporate PCs. However, as the IBM sales took off, I met anybody inside of IBM when I eventually got there that said, "Well that stupid campaign we had...."
> Because IBM’s BIOS was soon reverse engineered
Someone might also have read the BIOS source code listing that IBM provided:
https://archive.org/details/IBMPCIBM5150TechnicalReference63...
Anyone doing that was tainted due to copyright law.
> IBM brought the quality of it’s support and it’s endorsement as a personal computer that was worthy of ‘serious’ businesses.
It's only "it's" if it is "it is."
If it is not "it is," it's "its."
-----
Or to be clear (lol),
1) The possessive of "it" is "its."
2) "It's" is a contraction of "it is."
> 2) "It's" is a contraction of "it is."
... or "it has".
--
EDIT: I find it much easier to remember that "its" is (only) the possesive pronoun.
Can anyone remember when IBM made their own clones?
Ambra?
They had very unusual mice but I never saw one in the wild.
The sale to Lenovo went very well, when compared to how most mergers, acquisitions and consolidations went in the period. I can't remember Lenovo from before the acquisition and, again, I can't remember seeing any pre-Thinkpad Lenovo machines.
I was there. Ambra was an attempt to:
1. Get out from the blue tax 2. Have and alternative procurement path 3. Set up a channel where we might not cannibalize ourselves. 4. Free outselves from some of our rigorous engineering processes
It was basically a fail fast experiment, which is popular today. It was set up with the thought process that we wanted it more virtual and not to disrupt the core business. It became obvious pretty quick that it brought its own set of risks, and so we moved into Aptiva. It is good to try and fail and get out.
Actually, the Lenovo acquisition was a bit of a war. There was some visionary leadership from the most senior level of Lenovo that saw the core USA as extremely valuable, and allowed them to win arguments. While their long term goal was to move the core to China, they were careful to make sure they kept a lot of the USA team engaged, and many key USA individuals did move or travel constantly to China.
However, I wasn't a part of the company when it was sold, so most of this is top level feedback from my friends that did go.
Thanks for chiming in. I vaguely remember the press trolling IBM for Aptiva too.
Where were the Ambra machines sourced? Were they special clones like Compaq (where the BIOS was different), decent commodity clones like Dell or were they generic clones like everything off-brand?
I never understood what the value proposition was. Was it a bit like a supermarket own brand where the customer kind-of guesses that the brand leader makes them, much like how Americans know CostCo Kirkland diapers are made by Huggies?
The value prop is that we could launch a Dell (Gateway) channel by offering leading edge systems, and look for unique features, and live in the other guys holes. The team wasn't stupid, and they had a matrix of where they felt that they could put some products into the ecosystem that could occupy some space that Dell (Gateway) didn't have clear products. If I remember correctly, there was also some thought that we could cut off Dell in EMEA. (Europe.) Dell was far stronger in the USA at the time.
Being this is 30 years ago, I can't remember an exact matrix on some that wasn't my core product. But they had a strategy.
This was early in my career, but I happened to be in a pivotable position that got me access above my pay grade. (I have this weird background in both marketing and engineering, and as somebody that can speak both, I turned into basically a language translator in many meetings, then I was sent out as PR person to the magazines.) I did not work for the Ambra team, but they had an impact on my work, so I got to be involved a enough to see the edges.
I'm not going to have the exact numbers, but I remember that we stated that we were going to have no more than 8 IBMers involved with the thing. The Taiwanese clone market was just starting to take off, and we were starting to outsource to Taiwan. If I remember correctly, it was the Phoenix BIOS, who we had already done a deal with for our Consumer PC line. (Actually, it was co-development.)
As I already wrote, the final bit is that the guys had done some anonymous bid work, and had gotten some very aggressive bids--better than what we were getting. So, they had the impression that they could take a lot of cost out of the system. Also, we wanted to take out Dell and Gateway, but not impact the core IBM brand. Compaq was considered the real comp. HP second. Dell was this annoying "can't stop them because they always win the bids" company. Gateway was on the fringe, and more of a threat to our consumer brand, which was small at the time. But it was free TAM.
So, there was an impression if we followed the Dell/Gateway model, leading tech, very competitive pricing, and full page ads, with some systems that lived in the space, we could start to cannibalize the their TAM.
Now, you don't want to read back into history. The Dell then is not the Dell of now. But, buying behavior was stronger with Dell than the group anticipated. It just was tough to get the velocity growth they wanted. I think we launched in EMEA first, maybe because that is where the VP that ran the thing was from, and then it was rolled out in the USA. However, it just did not see the growth, and I remember there were some quality issues that the small group couldn't handle, but this is pretty foggy.
I will also state that the Round Rock team (and even Gateway), was incredibly tough competition in this arena. I would say that the team did not appreciate this.
However, it was never a massive corporate push for RTP--the home of the PC and PC Server. It was a "let's try this and see if we can learn something." I do remember most of us in the core PC team to NOT get involved as it wasn't pitched as being our core business. If I remember correctly, we did help share some information on parts that we procured to help them.
Its not Costco as the models are so different. As I have run a distribution business before, and Costco is really a marvel to me. My disti business was to the VAR channel, but my sister group used Costco and Walmart. Costco is absolute maniac about delivering value to their customers with quality. Really, it blows me away. They had a bunch of brands, and Sinegal said they could combine them all under Kirkland, turn it into a quality brand to drag up the entire Costco brand. He is so freaking brilliant, and I would argue unique to a company that had a distribution business that wanted to position themselves in the consumer's mind. I would argue that Costco never used their branding to indicate a "secret way" to get a better brand. I think that Costco is keen on making sure that Kirkland IS the brand, which is different than Ambra.
Thanks for asking. I don't think we ever did this type of post mortem at the time, and thinking through events always seems to generate learning for myself as I type it down.
In period, in the EU, Dell and Gateway 2000 operated out of Ireland using the 'Double Irish' tax fiddle:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_Irish_arrangement
At the time, customers had no idea that this was why these tech companies were operating out of Ireland. All they knew was that you got a lot for your money, and, more importantly, the latest tech. However, you might have to wait 28 days for delivery. It was important to the business model that Dell had not one single employee in the UK or other EU countries apart from Ireland, so it was call centre for everything before the web came along.
There may have been more to the Dell business model of customisation. In the UK, if you order a bespoke product, then you don't have the normal rights to just return it if you don't like it, you are stuck with it, and at the mercy of customer service.
I don't know if Dell played this card because they always had that refurbished gig going, where you could get good kit with a few dents and scratches. Nonetheless, there was very little manufacturing going on, it was just a screwdriver operation, final assembly of what amounted to knock-down kits. You did get the latest and greatest though,
Regardless, compare with the original IBM model where they made PCs in Greenock, Scotland. Undoubtedly you know more about this than I do. However, as I understand it, the original Scottish factory made typewriters before the PC came along, and IBM were incentivised to choose Scotland in the post war years, when the British government were quite serious about bringing industry to Scotland. Shipbuilding had gone on the Clyde, and with it steel and the outfitting and everything else that goes with shipbuilding. There was also an emotional reason for Greenock, Watson had Scottish ancestry.
The product that came out of Greenock was really good. To this day people want those keyboards that came out of there. The Trinitron monitors came from Sony's plant in Bridgend Wales, which they originally opened in the 1970s to make TVs, again with the usual government incentives. Sony also supplied Dell and Gateway 2000. Now all that has gone, RIP Trinitron, we loved you...
I am sure there was more to the supply chain, since, in period, semiconductors were made in Silicon Glen. However, these tended to be things like DRAM chips, where vast fortunes would be spent building a fab for it to be pretty much stillborn.
I am curious as to how 'vertically integrated' the IBM operation was, since hard disks were also made by IBM in Scotland. The IBM PC story is told as 'using commodity off the shelf parts', but IBM PCs were not a product of a screwdriver operation.
It is shocking that the UK have done so badly at tech. However, how was IBM supposed to compete against those tax fiddlers operating out of Dublin? Why did the EU allow Ireland in the UK when they were not taxing the big corporations? The Irish shot themselves in the foot with this as they ended up with house price inflation and very high personal taxation.
The UK also had a lot of tech in the M4 corridor, this being the motorway out of London that goes all the way to (drumroll...) Bridgend. Reading was the prime spot with Compaq, SGI, Microsoft, Oracle, Sybase and plenty of others setting up shop there.
In Reading there was an industrial estate that housed most of them, with their own private motorway. If you were on the train going past you imagined this as being a full on mini-Silicon-Valley, however, not a lot was going on in those impressive headquarter buildings. I am sure Sybase was just a couple of guys hassling the few customers they had for whatever license fees they could get from them, as for Microsoft, there was nobody writing code there, you just had product managers for things such as Microsoft Golf. Same with SGI, just a very big building with nobody in there. It all looked impressive from the train, however, it was just a Potemkin Village.
I am in genuine disbelief regarding how the UK messed up with tech given the advantages of a reasonably educated population, a reasonably high standard of English, access to the EU market, access to the former colonies, an army of 8-bit coders (from the BBC Micro project) and access to capital (London).
Ah, you are dredging up memories.
I've done both marketing and engineering. I managed a group at RTP responsible for a part of the engineering for PC, Thinkpads, and the Server group. While I had people go to Greenock, I never went personally. So, in some sense, I don't feel like I can give an adequate impression and background.
I will tell you that our team out of Greenock had a big impact on manufacturing, and some real live wires. I remember being at home on the weekend, and have a VP of manufacturing hunt me down to say words that normally IBMer wouldn't say in that I was bringing down his line. It really was the stereotypical Scottish Soccer fan type interaction. In this case, it turned out that it wasn't my group. After I left IBM, I ended up supplying tech to all my IBM competitors. I observed what I thought was basically all of IBM processes in their processes. Similar terminology that I know started at IBM. While we did see some people move, a big part of this was the supplier base.
We did do a lot of work with outside resources. For example, we "qualified" power supplies, but we basically did co-engineering. Part of our problem in that we would significantly change everybody's product, then they would sell it to Dell or Gateway. This was a very quick path to get your processes into the comp as the suppliers would "suggest" things that they had learned at IBM.
The hard drive issue is a bit more subtle. IBM was not the original supplier to our own PCs--and they had a melt down with a massive recall. I don't remember us making hard drives in Scotland. I remember Mainz, Rochester MN, San Jose, and Fujisawa. The PC client group took almost exclusively Fujisawa products. The server group worked to take San Jose/Rochester server products. Rochester was the 5.25 and then 3.5" lines for AS/400, so they were at first leading with the PC server group. I will relate that I think HDDs were always the #1 reason for Quality No Ship (QNS), mainly due to shock specs, which got better over time.
As to the delivery of tech in the UK. I would state that it is similar inside of the USA. Try as many want, tech seems to be focused in the New York, Bay Area and in Puget Sound. While I was in RPT, and this state killed themselves to get tech (including 3 incredible Universities right next door), for some reason it never turned into a tech hub. Without research, I would state that there is also an element of chance or luck that gets a region going, and can't be planned for. However, maybe your just pointing out that UK never even gave themselves any chance, which I am just not close enough to understand.
It's always interesting to see these types of articles with a bunch of people pontificating about what was or wasn't happening at IBM. I started my career at IBM and had the chance to engage with the Boca Raton group and the PC division there, working as an internal supplier within IBM. The idea that the PC Group was somehow destroyed by "antibodies" is ridiculous on its face—this notion is often spoken by people who have no real background with the group or a true understanding of what was going on.
As Patrick Lencioni has often said, we have things reported as strategy, when it turns out to be people issues. A lot of what happened at IBM only makes sense if you were there.
I'll list some things here, though since I'm late to the conversation, I’m not sure how much it will be observed. However, perhaps an IBMer who was with the PC Company will come across this and add a few more alternatives or supporting facts.
1. IBM was a wildly diverse place culturally. We had almost half a million employees worldwide. As with any large corporation, you could find divergent views—anyone could find a person or two to support anything they wanted to claim about the company. However, the PC division was generally well regarded. Sure, you can find somebody who said something about "antibodies", but you can find a lot more who would say that’s ridiculous. I tend more toward the latter than the former.
2. Don Estridge was a bit of a cowboy. He did love being down in Florida, which gave him the ability to move quickly. Still, I would say IBM allowed for its “wild ducks”, and while the PC group was one of the more obvious successes, it was not IBM’s only success. Estridge died in a well-publicized airplane accident at Dallas Fort Worth. I don't think most people understand how much cultural impact this had on the group. Although it could be debated, I do believe we could say it was as if Bill Gates or Steve Jobs had been taken out of their company. The amazing thing about the PC group is that it didn’t collapse after his death.
3. The single most destructive thing IBM did was thinking they could take the PC group out of Boca and transport it to Research Triangle Park. After it moved to RTP, I got to work there with many of the group’s core members. They consistently described how the move was traumatic to virtually every aspect of a team that was truly world-class. (Another issue: There was also a development decision in Boca that some decried—some forward-thinking was shelved—but I wasn’t heavily involved in that, and it wasn’t so universal.)
4. I was in the midst of the turmoil as IBM reached the midlife of the PC in RTP. By that stage, we had given up on the idea of clear, proprietary closed systems. Yet at the same time, we were doing some excellent engineering and marketing—we were finally winning awards from PC magazines for the desktops, and people already loved our laptops. But we were clearly hamstrung. Without going deep into details, it’s clear in today’s economy that certain business units serve different purposes. The PC Division was expected to make a lot of money while paying what was internally called “the blue tax.” In other words, corporate hit us with effective tax rates and metrics that basically made it impossible to compete with Compaq or Dell. What most people don’t realize is that one of the biggest impacts of selling the group to Lenovo was the removal of the blue tax. Many key U.S. development team members stayed with the company, and though Lenovo was committed to eventually moving true development headquarters to China, it would have collapsed without an incredibly dedicated group of IBMers who were unfailingly unselfish. There was something about the culture—dedication to the team was one of the most important things you could do, even after the group had been sold to Lenovo.
On reflection, if Estridge never died, and if the division had never moved from Boca, the computing industry would be very different as being apart of what happened.
> The PC Division was expected to make a lot of money while paying what was internally called “the blue tax.” In other words, corporate hit us with effective tax rates and metrics that basically made it impossible to compete with Compaq or Dell
Thank you for confirming the precise point that I made in the post!
I don't think this was what the external post was about. The Blue Tax was put on everybody, and was a requirement for a business model. The external post said nobody really wanted to sell the PC and "antibodies" made sure that the the IBM PC company would be rejected.
This is pretty well understood about defining your business model, and is not an antibody issue.
The real threat was Microsoft, which we understood at the time. Our biggest problem is not the OS, it was the apps.
I have made a part of fable on this here: https://theologic.substack.com/p/the-fable-continues-microso...
"I've Been Moved."
(-:
So somebody either has worked for IBM or had a family member worked there, as this is one of the standard jokes.
I was moved every two years, and it was a full M&L.
I will treasure my time there as remarkable rich.
The real "Personal Computer" is of course the smartphone.
No, because it became a locked down ecosystem that is user-hostile and not user-controllable. I realized this when I observed the younger generation, who I thought would be much better than us at computing, who had not a clue how anything worked because they never had the ability, need, or desire to tinker with the underlying systems, with only rare exceptions (roms, etc).
You are right, in a way. But losing your smartphone is like losing all your personal information. In that sense it is a personal computer.
Depends on your lifestyle and location. The only thing I use my cellphone for is text messaging and looking at wikipedia or part numbers when im not at home. It is definitely useful, but 95% of my computer work is still done on a PC.
> In that sense it is a personal computer.
No it is a "personal", but not "computer".
Not a general purpose computer, but still a computer.
A smartphone (-like device) has indeed the potential to be an ultramobile general-purpose personal computer. Sadly, virtually all of them don't reach that potential.