>The company is also asking UK government officials to provide emergency support for its suppliers to get through this period, according to people close to the talks.
The support is going to suppliers, who are the true victim, but it's privatize the gain, socialize the cost. JFR screwed up, so they should be the first to step up to assist the suppliers.
Long ago I had some contact with Wipro. We sold Wipro equipment and they'd sell it and their services to their customers.
Wipro would call up our tech support and declare "it's not working fix it, and you need to explain to our customer why it's not working". Basically they would outsource their own work to our support teams by reporting everything as a technical problem. In truth they just rack mounted equipment and connected cables and did nothing after that.
Wipro got real mad when on a few occasions in front of their clueless customers I said "this has never worked and has never been configured to work, can't fix it if it was never right...". After a while they stopped putting me on conference calls. Boy did they try to get me in trouble with my bosses a lot, never worked as I was good at documenting things.
Lots of their customers had backup systems that never backed up a thing, for years (if ever) ... but the customers also had nobody employed who would know better.
It was a shocking thing to witness. These companies were totally dependent on their outsourcing and they had no idea what was going on. A few of their customers were "critical infrastructure" type companies.
Judging by the comments on the exploit, it's down to some sloppy estate management - which is typical TCS, sadly.
I know their systems and I can well imagine there's conversation about a greenfield rebuild for the essential manufacturing systems happening or taking place. I can't imagine some of the old processes still being viable after this shocker.
TCS vehemently denied that any of their systems were compromised for the attack on M&S [1].
Perhaps they will do the same here but after some highly publicized security incidents sooner or later people will be calling a thorough independent audit of their systems.
[1] India's TCS says none of its systems were compromised in M&S hack:
I would imagine the pressure to use TCS at Tata Motors (owner of Jaguar Land Rover) is… strong, considering they’re both owned by the same corporate parent company.
>The company is also asking UK government officials to provide emergency support for its suppliers to get through this period, according to people close to the talks.
The support is going to suppliers, who are the true victim, but it's privatize the gain, socialize the cost. JFR screwed up, so they should be the first to step up to assist the suppliers.
This very much seems like a company circling the drain. The ‘it’s hackers’ line seems convenient.
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/sep/16/jaguar-land...
As terrible as the consequences are ... maybe they should be allowed to fail.
Other companies take notice and maybe actually take action.
Well M&S got knocked down by amateurism of TCS - https://www.consultancy.uk/news/40295/ms-hackers-may-have-ga...
Guess who was taking care for JLR's IT system? That's right, TCS.
https://doublepulsar.com/the-elephant-in-the-biz-outsourcing...
Long ago I had some contact with Wipro. We sold Wipro equipment and they'd sell it and their services to their customers.
Wipro would call up our tech support and declare "it's not working fix it, and you need to explain to our customer why it's not working". Basically they would outsource their own work to our support teams by reporting everything as a technical problem. In truth they just rack mounted equipment and connected cables and did nothing after that.
Wipro got real mad when on a few occasions in front of their clueless customers I said "this has never worked and has never been configured to work, can't fix it if it was never right...". After a while they stopped putting me on conference calls. Boy did they try to get me in trouble with my bosses a lot, never worked as I was good at documenting things.
Lots of their customers had backup systems that never backed up a thing, for years (if ever) ... but the customers also had nobody employed who would know better.
It was a shocking thing to witness. These companies were totally dependent on their outsourcing and they had no idea what was going on. A few of their customers were "critical infrastructure" type companies.
Judging by the comments on the exploit, it's down to some sloppy estate management - which is typical TCS, sadly.
I know their systems and I can well imagine there's conversation about a greenfield rebuild for the essential manufacturing systems happening or taking place. I can't imagine some of the old processes still being viable after this shocker.
TCS vehemently denied that any of their systems were compromised for the attack on M&S [1].
Perhaps they will do the same here but after some highly publicized security incidents sooner or later people will be calling a thorough independent audit of their systems.
[1] India's TCS says none of its systems were compromised in M&S hack:
https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/indias-tcs-sa...
I would imagine the pressure to use TCS at Tata Motors (owner of Jaguar Land Rover) is… strong, considering they’re both owned by the same corporate parent company.
Is there any information available on the systems affected and the challenges they are facing?